University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International
Adjudication
Nienke Grossman
University of Baltimore School of Law, ngrossman@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Courts Commons, International Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
Recommended Citation
Shattering the Glass Ceiling in International Adjudication, 56 Va. J. Int'l L. (forthcoming 2016)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING IN INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION
Nienke Grossman*
The Article shows that women are found in dramatically low numbers
on the benches of the majority of the world’s most important international
courts, analyzes the causes of this phenomenon and proposes and evaluates
solutions. It establishes that the number of women in the pool of potential
judges does not appear to dictate how many women become international
judges. It shows, too, that when selection procedures are closed and
opaque, and there is no quota or aspirational target for a sex-balanced
bench, women obtain international judgeships in disproportionately low
numbers. On the other hand, when a quota or aspirational target exists,
benches are more balanced. Finally, the Article suggests and evaluates
concrete reforms to selection procedures on international courts to remedy
this problem, including greater transparency and openness in selection
procedures, aspirational targets for the participation of women on the
bench and quotas. It is the first article to explore the relationship between
selection procedures and sex representativeness outcomes on international
courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty-four years ago, Hillary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and
Shelley Wright wrote a path-breaking feminist critique of international law
and institutions in the American Journal of International Law.1 While
applying feminist methodologies to international law and institutions is no
longer a novel endeavor, serious questions remain about the extent to which
the structures and content of international law continue to “privilege men,”
despite the elapse of almost a quarter century. How much international law
has made a difference to women and girls’ rights is questionable,
particularly when in many parts of the globe they continue to suffer from
physical abuse at the hands of both state and non-state actors, are prevented
from going to school, married off or trafficked as children, and used as child
soldiers. Progress in integrating women into international legal institutions
is uneven at best.
For example, the influential 34-member International Law
Commission and 11-member Inter-American Juridical Committee contained
only 2 female members each in June 2014.2 The UN human rights treaty
bodies show ghettoization of women on the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, where women made up 22 of 23
members, and on the Committee on the Rights of the Child, where they
accounted for 11 of 18 members. 3 Yet women made up only 10% of the
UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances,4 22% of the UN Human
Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.5
1

Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, Feminist
Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613 (1991).
2
Membership, available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.htm (last
visited
June
26,
2014);
Members,
http://www.oas.org/en/sla/iajc/members.asp (last visited June 26, 2014).
3
Membership,
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Membership.aspx
(last
visited
June
26,
2014);
Membership,
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRC/Pages/Membership.aspx
(last
visited June 26, 2014).
4
Members of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/Membership.aspx
(last
visited June 26, 2014).
5
Membership,
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/Membership.aspx (last
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Only the Committee on the Rights of Persons with disabilities was
relatively balanced; 7 out of 18 of its members were women. 6 At a 2014
International Council for Commercial Arbitration conference, self-reports
by participants established that 82.4% of those serving as arbitrators were
men, while only 17.6% were women.7 Only four female lawyers appeared
before the International Court of Justice more than once between 1999 and
2012, while 59 men appeared more than once during the same period.8 The
four female lawyers accounted for only 2.9% of the speaking time during
the fourteen year period studied.9
On most international courts and tribunals, the focus of this article,
men continue greatly to outnumber women on the bench. International
courts decide the scope of our human rights, what individuals should be
held accountable for atrocity crimes, what natural resources belong to which
states, when environmental concerns should trump trade rules and when the
use of force is allowed. They find facts, discern relevant rules of
international law and apply them, filling gaps when necessary.
International judges come from all over the world, but they do not appear to
reflect vast swathes of the world’s people.10 Most international court judges
visited
June
27,
2014);
Membership,
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/Membership.aspx (last
visited June 26, 2014). Three out of 14 of the members of the Committee on
Migrant
Workers
were
women.
Membership,
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/Pages/Membership.aspx (last
visited June 26, 2014). Women made up 30% of the UN Committee Against
Torture.
Membership,
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/Membership.aspx
(last
visited June 27, 2014).
6
Membership,
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Membership.aspx (last
visited June 26, 2014).
7
Susan Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the ‘Invisible
College’ of International Arbitration 17 (on file with author).
8
Shashank Kumar and Cecily Rose, A Study of Lawyers Appearing
Before the International Court of Justice, 25 EURO. J. INT’L L. 893, 904.
(2014).
9
Id.
10
A 2006 study found that of 215 international court judges, 63% came
from civil law countries, 14% from common law countries, and 23% came
from mixed common law/civil law, Islamic or local customary law blended
with civil or common law traditions. DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO
& LEIGH SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
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studied law in the top universities in their countries, while many also
studied international law, and a large majority had graduate or doctoral
degrees from top elite universities such as Harvard University, Columbia
University, the University of Cambridge, the University of London, Oxford
University, the University of Paris and the University of Moscow. 11 Judges
frequently have decades of experience and generally hale from three career
paths: the national judiciary, academia or civil service in international
organizations or for their own states as diplomats.12 The percentage of
international court judges from indigenous or poor backgrounds, minority
groups within their own countries or having disability status appears to be
relatively unquestioned and unknown.
We can say with certainty, however, that a great majority of
international courts are not representative when it comes to gender.13 On
eight international courts surveyed with no representativeness requirements
built into their selection procedures, only 15% of judges were women in
mid-2015.14 On the five courts with either aspirational representativeness
language or mandatory targets, 33% were women, however.15 Since 1998,
an average of 13% of judges on international courts without
representativeness requirements have been women, while, on average, 31%
of judges on courts with such mandates or aspirations were women.16
Courts without representativeness requirements include the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (one woman on a seven member bench), the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (one woman on a 21-member
MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 17 (2007).
11
Id. at 17-18.
12
Id. at 20. The study found that 40% came from academia, 33% were
professional national judges, and about 28% were either national or
international civil servants. Id. See also Erik Voeten, The Politics of
International Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 390 (2008).
13
See Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter
to the Legitimacy of International Courts?, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 647, 654
(2012) [hereinafter Grossman I]; see Part I, infra.
14
See Part I, infra.
15
These courts include the European Court of Human Rights, the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the International Criminal
Court, and only ad litem judges for the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
16
These percentages were obtained by adding up the total number of
slots in which women judges served every year since the courts were
established and dividing it by the total number of slots in which both male
and female judges served every year since establishment.
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bench), and the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body (one woman
on a 7-member bench).
These statistics establish that Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright’s
critique of international institutions remains relevant for most international
courts. While some may take for granted that sex representativeness on the
bench, or generally approximating the ratio of the sexes in the general
population, is worth aspiring to for a number of reasons, others appear
skeptical about its importance. A prominent commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court described the requirement for
“fair representation” on the bench as a “gesture in the direction of political
correctness.”17 There are on-going debates on whether a representativeness
requirement should be applied to investment panels in the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership,18 and whether commissioner and judicial
diversity matters for the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human
Rights.19 Judges and individuals involved in judicial selection on the
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court have
expressed mixed views about the importance of sex representation
requirements.20 While the requirements for legal, linguistic and
geographical diversity are widely accepted, “attitudes towards gender
balance are generally much more ambivalent.”21
Yet the paucity of women judges on most international court
benches is worrisome for a number of reasons. First, it affects both the
normative and sociological legitimacy of international courts. 22 Scholars of
normative legitimacy ask what characteristics ought to be present for a
court’s authority to be justified, while students of sociological legitimacy
focus on what drives perceptions of justified authority.23 Legitimacy rests
17

John R.W.D. Jones, Composition of the Court, in ANTONIO CASSESE,
PAOLO GAETA AND JOHN R.W.D. JONES (eds.), THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 255 (2002).
18
Email discussion on OGEMID listserv (July 1-2, 2014) (on file with
author).
19
CEJIL, Proceso de selección de integrantes de la comisión y la corte
inter-americana de derechos humanos: reflexiones hacia una reforma
(2014).
20
RUTH MACKENZIE ET AL., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES:
PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS 1 (2010) [hereinafter SELECTING
INTERNATIONAL JUDGES].
21
Id. at 48-49.
22
See Grossman I, supra note 13, at 652.
23
Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A
Coming Challenge for
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in part on the impartiality of a court.24 If men and women approach judging
differently, whether based on nature or nurture, a homogeneous bench is
inherently biased. Few studies of the gender effect of judging on
international courts exist, due in part to the paucity of women on the
bench.25 But one study showed that women judges are much more likely to
rule in favor of jurisdiction in International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes ICSID cases than men.26 Another established that
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia panels with
female judges imposed more severe sanctions on defendants who assaulted
females, while men imposed more severe sanctions on defendants who
assaulted men.27 Judge Navanethem Pillay, the only woman on a panel
hearing Jean Paul Akayesu’s case before the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, is credited with vigorously questioning witnesses
about sexual violence, ultimately resulting in the first conviction of an
individual for the crime against humanity of rape and of genocide founded
on rape.28 And several renowned female international court judges have
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 601 (1999);
Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107, 116 (2009) [hereinafter Grossman II].
24
See BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY 17-18 (1995); see also
David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the
Legitimacy of International Criminal Law, Working Paper No. 1154117,
*13 (Georgetown University Law Center, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1154177;
TOM
R.
TYLER, LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
4 (Tom R. Tyler, ed. 2007); Grossman II, supra note 23, at 129.
25
See Kimi L. King & Megan Greening, Gender Justice of Just
Gender? The Role of Gender in Sexual Assault Decisions at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 88 SOC. SCI. Q.
1049, 1050 n. 2 (2007) (examining the relationship between sentence length
and sex of the judge and victim, but not including the ICTR because “there
are too few [women judges] to conduct empirical analysis and virtually all
the guilty defendants received life sentences.”).
26
Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, ASIL
Research Forum *35 (UCLA Nov. 5, 2011), online at
http://www.asil.org/midyearmeeting/pdfs/papers/November_5_2pm/Are%2
0Arbitrators%20Political.pdf (visited Nov. 18, 2011).
27
King & Greening, supra note 25, at 1049-1050, 1065-66.
28
Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 277, 282 (2002); see also Navanethem Pillay, Equal Justice
for Women: A Personal Journey, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 657, 665-66 (2008);
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made the point that women bring a different set of life experiences to the
bench than men do.29
Even if men and women do not think differently, if they can
overcome their differences, or if there is no essence unique to women as a
group or men as a group in the first place, sex unrepresentativeness can still
harm perceptions of legitimacy.
For example, non-governmental
organizations and some states argued for including women on the benches
of post-WWII international criminal tribunals because they believed women
might make a difference in the prosecution of international crimes against
women.30 Constituencies, especially those traditionally excluded from
power, may continue to believe unrepresentative courts are biased against
them. South Africa could not have countenanced an all-white all-male
judiciary, even if all the judges were “cured” of racism and sexism the day
after Apartheid ended. In light of Third World critiques of international law
and institutions, it is not surprising that the drafters of the World Trade
Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding chose to give developing
states the right to demand adjudicators from developing countries on
dispute settlement panels hearing cases involving both developing and
developed states.31 The exclusion of women from international law-making
institutions historically has raised similar concerns among feminist
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4, paras. 696, 731
(ICTR, Sept. 2, 1988); José E. Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu
Judgment, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359 ,362-63 (1999).
29
See e.g., Patricia Wald, Six Not-So-Easy Pieces: One Woman’s
Journey to the Bench and Beyond, 36 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 979, 989 (2005);
Patricia Wald, What Do Women Want from International Criminal Justice?
To Help Shape the Law (Intlawgrrls Oct. 5, 2009)), online at
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com2009/10/what-do-women-want-frominternational-law.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2011); TERRIS, ET AL., supra
note 10, 48, 186-87 (containing comments by former ICC Judge
Navanethem Pillay and former Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga).
30
See Grossman I, supra note 13, at 661-64.
31
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, art. 8(10), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1232 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Understanding] (“when a dispute is between a developing country Member
and a developed country Member the panel shall, if the developing country
Member so requests, include at least one panelist from a developing country
Member”).
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scholars.32
Democratic legitimacy provides another compelling reason for sex
representation on international courts: those affected should be represented
among decision-makers. International courts exercise public authority by
interpreting and shaping international law. “The de facto lawmaking role
played by international judges cannot be denied.”33 This authority requires
justification, and democratic values such as representation provide a
meaningful justification.34 Both women and men are the beneficiaries of
the work of international courts and should be involved in judicial decisionmaking for these institutions to possess justified authority.
There are, of course, other justifications beyond legitimacy, for
seeking sex representation on the bench. The presence of members of
previously excluded groups in positions of influence may create mentorship
opportunities and role models for others; it may give previously excluded
groups the sense that they too can succeed. One study found that more
female members of parliament correlates with more discussion of politics
by both adolescent and adult women, increased participation in politics by
adult women, and a greater intention to participate in politics among
adolescent girls.35 The same phenomenon may exist in other environments.
32

See HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 308 (2000).
33
TERRIS ET AL., supra note 10, at 115–17 (discussing a number of
different examples, ranging from the European and Inter-American human
rights courts’ contribution to the development of human rights law “far
beyond what the original drafters [of the respective conventions] might
have conceived,” to the role of the European Court of Justice in European
integration, to the WTO Appellate Body’s inclusion of other areas of
international law within its jurisdiction); see also Armin von Bogdandy &
Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as
Lawmakers, 12 GERMAN L. J. 979, 979 (2011) (stating that international
judicial decisions influence future decisions); Nienke Grossman, The
Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMPLE L. REV. 61, 6876 (2013) [hereinafter Grossman III] (explaining how international courts
influence the development of law and politics).
34
Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 226–27 (2008). Armin von Bogdandy and
Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial
Lawmaking, 12 GER. L. J. 1341, 1343 (2011).
35
Christina Wolbrecht & David E. Campbell, Leading by Example:
Female Members of Parliament as Political Role Models, 51 AM. J. POLI.
SCI. 921-39 (2007); see also, e.g., Kijana Crawford & Danielle Smith, The
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And having diverse judges can have ripple effects on homogenous counsel
as well. For example, appearing with an all-male team of lawyers before a
Court with several women judges, some of whom may have called for
greater diversity in the bar, may be ill-advised.
Further, states are under an international legal obligation to grant
men and women equal access to employment on international court
benches. The United Nations Charter specifies the United Nations, “shall
place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in
any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary
organs.”36 Courts affiliated with the United Nations in some way or another
include the International Court of Justice (primary judicial organ), the
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (created by Security
Council Resolutions), and the International Criminal Court (through referral
and deferral by the Security Council), among others. In addition, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights indicates that States
Parties “undertake to ensure the equal rights of men and women to the
enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant,”
including the right and opportunity to take part in the conduct of public
affairs and to have access “on general terms of equality” to public service.37
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women provides further evidence of state’s obligation to take steps to
ensure the participation of women at all levels of governance. States Parties
are obligated to “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the political and public life of the country and, in
particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right… to
participate in the formulation of government policy and the implementation
hereof and to hold public office and perform all public functions at all levels
of government.” 38 International courts fall within the scope of the

We and the US: Mentoring African American Women, 36 J. BLACK STUDS.
52 (2005) (referring to the importance of mentoring to the career
development of African American female administrators in higher
education).
36
United Nations Charter, art. 8. The Preamble “reaffirm[s] faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.”
37
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 3, 25,
adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 3, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
38
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women art. 7, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW].
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obligation to ensure participation of women.39
The absence or paucity of a significant proportion of the world’s
population from most international court benches suggests that something is
awry.
Why are women found in such meager numbers on most
international court benches? Is a smaller pool of qualified women than men
the reason? Who is selected for these positions, who is not, and why not?
What does the paucity of women tell us about what values are driving the
process of judicial selection on most international courts, and whether and
how it may be flawed? Is outright discrimination against women the cause?
Does a glass ceiling remain to be shattered in the international judiciary?
Almost a quarter-century after Chinkin, Charlesworth and Wright wrote
their seminal article, these questions deserve renewed attention and debate.
This is the first full-length journal article to attempt to tackle these
questions.40 It examines the relationship between selection procedures and
sex representation on various international court benches. In so doing, it
takes into account both quantitative and qualitative data on twelve different
international courts, and it adopts a comparative approach to studying
international courts. Although each of these courts operates within its own
specific institutional and legal contexts, comparing their procedures and
outcomes can result in insights into best and worst practices and what steps
can be taken to strengthen these increasingly important institutions. The
article exposes troubling qualities of selection procedures, which, if
39

The CEDAW Committee subsequently clarified that obligations
extend “to all areas of public and political life” and are not limited to those
spelled out in article 7. “It refers to the exercise of political power, in
particular the exercise of legislative, judicial, executive and administrative
powers. The term covers all aspects of public administration and the
formulation and implementation of policy at the international, national,
regional and local levels.” U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 23: Political
and
Public
Life,
16th
Sess.
1997,
at
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm
#recom22. CEDAW’s article 8 states that “States Parties shall take all
appropriate measures to ensure to women, on equal terms with men and
without any discrimination, the opportunity to represent their Governments
at the international level and to participate in the work of international
organizations.” CEDAW, supra note 38, art. 8.
40
But see, e.g., Jan Linehan, Women and Public International Litigation
(Project on International Courts and Tribunals 2002), availabe at
http://www.pict-pcti.org/publications/PICT_articles/ Women1.pdf (last
visited January 19, 2015) (providing a brief introduction to the topic).
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remedied, may provide greater opportunities to others traditionally excluded
from international court judgeships, as well as enhance the legitimacy
credentials of these institutions. At the same time, it shows that trade-offs
may exist between inclusion of women and other less traditional candidates,
and states’ desires to exert a high degree of control over international
judicial selection procedures.
Part I provides statistics on sex representativeness on twelve global
and regional international courts and establishes that women continue to
serve on the vast majority of these institutions in paltry numbers. Part II
seeks to explain whether and why glass ceilings continue to exist on most
international courts. It argues that although women may make up a smaller
percentage of elite lawyers, high level legal academics and diplomats than
men, a smaller pool is an unsatisfying explanation for a number of reasons.
Second, national nominations tend to be opaque and known only to a small
group of insiders, making it difficult for potential candidates to be aware of
and apply for positions at the national level. Third, where courts employ
institutional screening mechanisms which interview, evaluate or rank
candidates at the international level, women appear in greater numbers.
Fourth, women tend to be present in higher numbers where constitutive
instruments require or aspire to the inclusion of both male and female
judges, as compared to when no such language is present.
Achieving sex representativeness requires the consideration and
eventual implementation of reforms to judicial selection procedures. Part III
proposes a number of possibilities for opening nomination procedures at the
national level, including requiring states to publicize their procedures at the
national level and the use of nominating commissions at the national or
international levels. Ultimately, it argues that if measures aimed at opening
and making more transparent selection procedures fail to make the bench
more representative or if states reject them, states should consider
aspirational language for the inclusion of both male and female judges, as
well as temporary mandatory quotas to enhance sex representation on the
bench.
I. HOW BALANCED ARE INTERNATIONAL COURT BENCHES?
Table 1 shows the percentage of women judges serving on twelve
different international courts in mid-2015. These courts span a wide array
of subject matters, from human rights to the Law of the Sea to international
economic law to international criminal law, as well as many of the regions
of the world. They include the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights, the Andean Tribunal of Justice, the European Court of Human
Rights, the European Court of Justice, the Court for the Economic

7-Sep-15]

SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING

13

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, the International Court
of Justice, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former
Yugoslavia, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, and the
World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body. The data are drawn from
court websites or other relevant publications in mid-2015.41 Ad hoc
41

Current Judges, European Court of Justice, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/ (last visited June 1, 2015);
Former Judges, European Court of Justice, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_9606/#CJE (last visited June 1, 2015);
Judges of the Court, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
available
at
http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/about-thecourt/jurisdiction-3/judges (last visited June 1, 2015); Email from Ana Rita
Ramirez of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to author,
concerning current and former judges (16 February 2015) (on file with
author); Zaffaroni elected to inter-American rights court, Buenos Aires
Herald.com,
June
17,
2015,
available
at
http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/191791/zaffaroni-elected-tointeramerican-rights-court (last visited June 26, 2015); ECOWAS Court
Holds Valedictory Court Session for Six Retiring Judges, ECOWAS Press
Release
(June
20,
2014),
available
at
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=223:valedictorycourtsessionforsixretiringjudges&catid=14:pr
essrelease&Itemid=36 (last visited June 26, 2015); The Past Members of the
Court, ECOWAS (last visited June 26, 2015), available at
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=29&Itemid=32 (last visited June 26, 2015); The Judges of the
Community
Court
of
Justice,
ECOWAS,
available
at
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=260&Itemid=31http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=260&Itemid=31 (last visited
June 26, 2015); Current Judges – Biographical Notes, International
Criminal
Court,
available
at
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20jud
ges/Pages/judges.aspx (last visited June 25, 2015); Former Judges,
International
Criminal
Court,
available
at
http://www.icccpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20ju
dges/pages/former%20judges.aspx (last visited June 25, 2015); Judges
Continuing in Office to Complete Proceedings, International Criminal
Court,
available
at
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20jud
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investment or trade arbitral panels, such as those arising under the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes or the World
Trade Organization are not included.42

ges/Pages/judges%20continuing%20in%20office%20to%20complete%20pr
oceedings.aspx (last visited June 25, 2015); Judges of the Court since 1959,
European
Court
of
Human
Rights,
available
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/List_judges_since_1959_ENG.pdf (last
visited April 30, 2015); Appellate Body Members, World Trade
Organization,
available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm
(last visited June 25, 2015); All Members, International Court of Justice,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=2
(last visited June 25, 2015); Libro Testimonio Comunitario, Tribunal
Andino
de
Justicia
(2004),
available
at
http://www.tribunalandino.org.ec/sitetjca/index.php?option=com_filecabine
t&view=files&id=7&Itemid=35 (last visited June 26, 2015); Emails from
Angie Sasaki of Andean Tribunal of Justice to author (Dec. 5, 2014, April
16, 2015, May 5, 2015) (on file with author); Members, International
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, available at https://www.itlos.org/thetribunal/members/ (last visited June 25, 2015); Members of the Tribunal
since 1996, International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, available at
https://www.itlos.org/en/the-tribunal/members-of-the-tribunal-since-1996/
(last visited June 28, 2015); Annual Reports of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda to the General Assembly and Security Council, 19962014; Chambers, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, available at http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal/chambers (last
visited June 1, 2015); The Judges, ICTY, available at
http://www.icty.org/sid/151 (last visited June 1, 2015); Former Judges,
ICTY, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/10572 (last visited June 1,
2015). When one judge completed his or her tenure during the same year as
another was elected, only the judge elected that year was counted for that
year.
42
In 2009, only 9% of ICSID arbitrators were women and 17% of WTO
panel members were women. See Grossman I, supra note 13, at 680. In
2007, Susan Franck found that only 3.5% of investment treaty arbitrators
were women. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N. C. L. REV. 1, 81 (2007).

7-Sep-15]

SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING

15

Table 1. Percentage Women Judges on Courts in Mid-2015
Court

Af. Ct. HPR ATJ

ECHR

% Women
(mid 2015)

2/11 = 18%

2/4 = 50%

Nationality

Nigeria,
Uganda

Bolivia,
Colombia

ECJ

ECOWAS

IACHR

15/45 = 33% 5/28 = 18%

1/7 = 14%

1/7 = 14%

Austria,
Croatia,
Estonia,
Finland,
Georgia,
Germany,
Ireland,
Monaco,
Romania,
San Marino,
Sweden,
Switzerland,
FYR
Macedonia,
Turkey,
Ukraine

Guineau
Bissau

Costa Rica

Spain,
Romania,
Austria,
Netherlands,
Estonia

Court

ICC

ICJ

ICTR

ICTY

ITLOS

WTO-AB

% Women
(mid 2015)

7/18 = 39%

3/15 = 20%

Permanent
2/9 = 22%

Permanent
2/19 = 11%

1/21 = 5%

1/7 = 14%

Ad Litem
0/1 = 0%

Ad Litem
1/3 = 33%

Total
2/10 = 20%

Total
3/22 = 14%
Argentina

China

Nationality

Japan,
Kenya,
Botswana,
Dominican
Republic,
Belgium,
Argentina,
Brazil

China,
Uganda,
United
States

Madagascar, Madagascar,
Pakistan
Pakistan

Table 1 demonstrates that the smallest court in the group, the Andean
Tribunal of Justice, was also the court with the highest percentage of
women judges in mid-2015. Two of the four judges, or 50%, were women.
The next highest percentage of women served on the International Criminal
Court, with 39% percent women judges, or 7 female out of 18 total judges,
and then the European Court of Human Rights, where women made up 33%
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of the 45 judges on the court. On the nine remaining courts, men made up
80% or more of the total number of judges on the bench.
Table 1 also lists the countries of origin of women judges.
Interestingly, the vast majority of the women on the global, rather than
regional, courts came from outside of Western Europe and the United
States. The women on the International Criminal Court were from Japan,
Kenya, Botswana, Dominican Republic, Belgium, Argentina and Brazil.
Only one of seven women on the ICC came from Western Europe. The
women on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Appellate Chamber
were from Pakistan and Madagascar. The lone women on the World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Body’s Appellate Body and on the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea were Chinese and
Argentinian, respectively. One of the three women on the ICJ, Joan
Donoghue, haled from the United States, while the other two female judges
were Chinese and Ugandan. While not all states are parties to all of the
global courts,43 a significant number of Western European and North
American states are parties to or participate in most of them.
Figures 1 through 12 show the percentage of women judges serving
on these same twelve courts from their establishment through mid-2015.
While on some courts, a discernable upwards trend exists in the percentage
of women judges, on others the number of women appears to have stayed
constant or relatively, or decreased. The data suggest that the percentage of
women judges has generally increased over time on the Andean Tribunal of
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the International Court of
Justice. On the other hand, the number of women has remained constant on
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and relatively constant on
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, since Elsa Kelly became
the only woman to have served on the bench in 2011. The percentage of
woman serving on the bench today is lower than in previous years on the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ECOWAS, the ICTY and ICTR for
both permanent and ad litem judges, the International Criminal Court, the
WTO Appellate Body, the European Court of Human Rights, and the
European Court of Justice.

43

The ICTY and the ICTR were created by Security Council
resolutions, and therefore no state is formally a “party.” S.C. Res. 827, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (ICTY) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C.
Res, 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (ICTR) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
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Figure 1. African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights
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Figure 2. Andean Tribunal of Justice
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Figure 3. European Court of Human Rights
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Figure 4. European Court of Justice
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Figure 5. ECOWAS
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Figure 6. Inter-American Court of Human Rights
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014

Female %

20

SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING

[1-Aug-15

Figure 7. International Criminal Court
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

Female %

20%
10%
0%

Figure 8. International Court of Justice
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Figure 9. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
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Figure 10. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
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Figure 11. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
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Figure 12. World Trade Organization Appellate Body
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
Female %

20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015

Figure 13 compares the percentage of women judges each year on
all courts with representation requirements, either in the form of mandatory
or virtually mandatory quotas – the ICC and the ECHR since 2004 – or
aspirational language favoring balanced representation of the sexes – the
ECHR from the late 1990s until 2003, the ICTY and ICTR with respect to
ad litem judges only, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The ECHR is included in the group of courts with representation
requirements since establishment, even though its emphasis on balanced
representation began only in the late 1990s. While the percentage of women
judges has increased over time for both categories of courts, the overall
percentage of women judges on courts with no representativeness
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requirement has never broken 20%. It has reached 40% for courts with
representativeness requirements.

Figure 13. Percentage Female Judges - All Surveyed Courts
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Figure 14 contains the percentage of slots allocated to women on
each of the twelve courts since their establishment. The percentage was
calculated by dividing the total number of women judges each year by the
total number of male and female judges per year. The ICC is the Court that
has had the most slots allocated to women since its establishment (47%),
followed by ad litem judges on the ICTY (41%), and then ECOWAS
(40%). Women served in the lowest percentages on ITLOS (2%), the ICJ
(3%), the ECJ (6%), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (10%).
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Figure 14. Percentage Slots Allocated to Women Since Court's
Establishment
Average
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II.

WHY SO FEW WOMEN?
Why are women under-represented and men over-represented on
most international courts in comparison to their numbers in the world’s
population?44 While a smaller pool of candidates appears to help explain
the statistics to some extent, the argument lacks persuasive force when
analyzed in light of the data on women’s participation on international
courts. A comparison of national nomination procedures and selection
procedures at the international level suggests that courts with more open
nomination procedures and institutional screening mechanisms may put
more women on the bench. In addition, courts with mandatory or near
mandatory sex representation requirements are more likely to have higher
percentages of women on the bench. Finally, a lack of political will may
account to some degree for the paucity of women on most international
court benches, presenting a substantial hurdle to diversification of the
international judiciary.
A. The Limited Pool
44

A United Nations Study estimated that in 2010, there were 101.6
males per 100 females in the world. United Nations, Population Division,
Statistics,
available
at
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ExcelData/population.htm (last visited May 26, 2014).
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One possible explanation for the paucity of women judges on
international courts is that they make up a much smaller percentage of the
available pool of candidates than men do. Judges are usually selected from
legal academia, the judiciary and the diplomatic corps in each country.45
Women are typically found in lower numbers than men in the legal
profession generally, and in the highest echelons of the profession in most if
not all countries. In many states, women make up a smaller proportion of
lawyers. An exceptional example is Saudi Arabia, which only recently
allowed women to become lawyers.46 According to a recent study by Ethan
Michelson, 36% of all countries have fewer than 30% female lawyers, and
36% of the world’s lawyers are women.47
While the number of women lawyers is high in some states,
numbers alone do not paint an accurate picture of women’s status in the
legal profession globally or in each state. Women are frequently
underrepresented at the highest levels of the profession. For example, while
Michelson’s study estimated that 48% of lawyers in the UK are female,
women accounted for 35% of practicing barristers and 11% of Queen’s
Counsel in 2010.48 A similar dynamic exists in the South African courts.49
In 2003, nearly 60% of law schools in the UK had never had a female
professor and 83% of all law professors were men.50 A 2003 book
examining women in the legal profession from a comparative perspective
45

TERRIS, ROMANO & SWIGART, supra note 10, at 20.
Neil MacFarquhar, Saudi Monarch Grants Women Right to Vote,
N.Y.
Times,
Sept.
25,
2011,
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/world/middleeast/women-to-vote-insaudi-arabia-king-says.html.
47
Ethan Michelson, Women in the Legal Profession, 1970-2010: A
Study of the Global Supply of Lawyers, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
1071, 1089, Table A6, 35 (2013). A sampling of estimates of the percentage
of female lawyers is drawn from the study: 32% (USA), 5% (India), 66%
(Brazil), 35% (Mexico), 21% (China), 48% (UK), 45% (Russia), 27%
(Indonesia), 26% (Egypt), 50% (France), 16% (Japan). Id.
48
About
the
Bar:
Statistics,
The
Bar
Council,
http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/about-the-bar/facts-andfigures/statistics/#AllBarStats, (last visited March 23, 2014).
49
Ruth B. Cowan, Women’s Representation on the Courts in the
Republic of South Africa, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
291, s. C (2006).
50
Celia Wells, The Remains of the Day: The Women Law Professors
Project, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS 227(Ulrike
Schultz & Gisela Shaw, eds., 2003).
46
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found that women were underrepresented in the most lucrative sectors and
highest echelons of the legal profession in most countries surveyed,
including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, UK, Israel, Germany, Holland,
Poland, France and Japan.51 Several studies reach the same conclusions in
the United States.52
Although lower levels of the judiciary in many countries are
increasingly feminized, men continue to be overrepresented in most
countries, especially at intermediate and highest court levels. 53 In 2010,
women generally made up 0%, 8%, 18%, 25%, 33%, and 35% of the higher
courts of Paraguay, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and Costa Rica’s
51

Fiona M. Kay & Joan Brockman, Barriers to Gender Equality in the
Canadian Legal Establishment, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL
PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 60; Rosemary Hunter, Women in the Legal
Profession: The Australian Profile, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL
PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 89; Georgina Murray, New Zealand Women
Lawyers at the End of the Twentieth Century, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S
LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 128-29; Clare M.S. McGlynn, The
Status of Women Lawyers in the United Kingdom, in WOMEN IN THE
WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 139; see Bryna Bogoch,
Gender, Trials and Professional Performance in Israel, in WOMEN IN THE
WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 251 (While “occupational
segregation” exists in Israel, women “have reached the peak of the
profession in the public sphere.”); Ulrike Schultz, The Status of Women
Lawyers in Germany, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS,
supra n. 50, at 285, 278-9 (pointing out that less than 6% of law professors
in Germany were women in 2003); Leny E. de Groot- van Leuwen, Women
in the Dutch Legal Profession (1950-2000), in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S
LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 343, 354; Malgorzata Fuszara, Women
Lawyers in Poland under Impact of Post-1989 Transformation, in WOMEN
IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 375-6, 383; see also
Anne Boigeol, Male Strategies in the Face of the Feminisation of a
Profession, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at
405, 412-13; Yuriko Kaminaga & Jorn Westhoff, Women Lawyers in
Japan: Contradictory Factors in Status, in WOMEN IN THE WORLD’S LEGAL
PROFESSIONS, supra n. 50, at 480-1.
52
See, e.g., Steven A. Boutcher & Carole Silver, Gender and Global
Lawyering: Where are the Women?, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 8,
(2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258221.
53
See, e.g., Maritza Formisano & Valentine M. Moghadam, Women in
the Judiciary in Latin America: An Overview of Progress and Gaps,
UNESCO (2005), 4, 20 (discussing Latin America).
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higher courts, respectively.54 Similarly, while women are present in high
numbers at the lowest levels of the judiciary in the Netherlands, France,
Spain and Italy, it takes them longer to be promoted and they are present in
low numbers at the highest levels of the judicial hierarchy. 55 According to
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in
2012, 49.2% of professional judges in OECD countries were women, but
only 29.4% of court presidents and 26% of Supreme Court justices were
women.56 In April 2011, according to the UN Progress of the World’s
Women 2011-2012 Report, women made up 67% of the judges on the
highest courts of Serbia and 50% in Rwanda, but no women judges were
present on the highest courts of Andorra, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Hungary,
Malaysia, Pakistan and Peru.57 Overall, for 65 of 78 states surveyed for the
UN report, women made up 33% or less of the bench. 58
Studies have identified numerous causes for the lower percentage of
female lawyers at the highest levels of the legal profession at the domestic
level, including the inflexible structure of specific work environments such
as large private law firms, shouldering a disproportionate burden of
domestic responsibilities, opting out to care for family due to familyunfriendly policies, preferring increased flexibility and discrimination. 59
To the extent that glass ceilings or discrimination keep women at lower
levels of the judiciary in the domestic context, the available pool will look
smaller than it is.
The extent to which women are present (or absent) at the bars of
international courts may also have an impact on the diversity of the bench.
54

Sital Kalantry, Women in Robes, AMERICA’S Q. 83, 84 Table I
(Summer 2012) (citing Economic Commission for Latin America statistics
from
1998-2010),
http://www.lwv.org/files/Women%20in%20RobesSital%20Kalantry.pdf (last visited May 22, 2014).
55
Justice Susan Glazebrook, Talk delivered to Chapman-Tripp Women
and Law Event, Looking through the Glass: Gender Inequality at the Senior
Levels of New Zealand’s Legal Profession 3 (2010).
56
OECD, Gender Equality, Women in Government, available at
http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/womeningovernment.htm (last visited
June 25, 2015).
57
UN Women, 2011- 2012 Progress of the World’s Women Figure 2.6
(New York: UN Women, 2011).
58
Id.
59
See, e.g., generally, Leah V. Durant, Gender Bias and the Legal
Profession: A Discussion of Why There Are Still So Few Women on the
Bench, 4 MARGINS: MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 181
(2004); Boutcher & Silver, supra note [[]], at 9.
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For example, women are present in meager numbers as oral advocates at the
International Court of Justice. In the 33 contentious cases argued in the ICJ
between 1999 and 2012, women made up only 11% of lawyers arguing
before the Court, and their arguments made up only 7.44% of the total
speaking time.60 Only four female lawyers appeared before the ICJ more
than once in the entire 13 year period, while 59 men appeared more than
once during the same period, and these four female lawyers accounted for
only 2.9% of the speaking time.61 There are calls for increased diversity
among counsel before the International Criminal Court as well.62 Even if
the career path of an international judge does not necessarily include
serving as a litigator before it, the lack of diversity on the bench and at the
bar may contribute to a culture of complacency. It is normal to see few
women in these contexts. The lack or paucity of women may make the
problem itself invisible or appear inevitable.63
It is difficult to quantify the pool of women available from the
diplomatic corps due to a lack of systematic comparative data. Nonetheless,
in many OECD countries, women tend to be found in higher numbers in the
public sector than in the private sector; they made up 57% of public sector
employees in OECD countries in 2010. 64 Women held 40% of middle
management positions and 29% of top management positions in
government in 2010.65 According to United Nations statistics, women
made up an average of 29% of legislators, senior officials, and managers in
the world.66 Yet, in 2012, only 11 out of 115 European Union Ambassadors

60

Kumar & Rose, supra note 8, at 904.
Id.
62
ICC-ASP/12/Res.8, § 33 (27 Nov. 2013), available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-Res8-ENG.pdf.
63
See Cowan, supra note 49, at s. D (explaining that women judges in
South Africa stress the need for greater visibility of women on the South
African bench, “so that women in judicial robes can become part of the
cultural consciousness…”).
64
OECD, Gender Equality, Women in Government, available at
http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/womeningovernment.htm (last visited
June 25, 2015).
65
Id.
66
See Statistics and Indicators on Women and Men, Women’s Share of
Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers, United Nations Statistics
Division,
available
at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/indwm/default.htm
(last
visited June 25, 2015).
61
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were women.67
The limited pool argument lacks persuasive force for a number of
reasons. First, in a world where women serve as presidents, ambassadors,
judges, and professors, it is difficult to believe that only one woman in
North, South or Central America or the Caribbean is qualified to sit on the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, only one woman in the Economic
Community of West Africa can meet the requirements of its court, and that
only one woman in a world of over 7 billion people is qualified to sit on the
Law of the Sea Tribunal or the World Trade Organization’s Appellate
Body. In other words, a very small pool is still sufficient to fill a handful of
open seats on international courts. Second, the limited pool argument is
unconvincing where women are present in higher numbers for a period and
then drop off substantially. The ECOWAS Court, the WTO Appellate
Body, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had three women on
their seven-member benches just a few years ago, but they only had one
each by mid-2015. The percentage of women judges has also dropped
dramatically over time on both the ICTY and the ICTR. It is reasonable to
assume that the female pool of qualified candidates would grow over time,
not shrink.
In addition, the limited pool argument fails to explain why some
global courts with very similar qualifications requirements and subject
matter jurisdictions exhibit stark differences in the percentages of female
judges. In mid-2015, women made up 39% of judges on the ICC, but only
11% and 22% of permanent judges on the ICTY and the ICTR.
Presumably, ICC judges should have similar qualifications to those on the
ICTY or ICTR, since all of them address international criminal law matters.
In the same vein, a limited pool cannot explain why so many more women
have served as ad litem judges on the ICTY than permanent judges, or why
the number of women ad litem judges on the ICTR dropped from a high of
60% in 2004 to a low of 20% in 2011.68
67

See, e.g., Talyn Rahman-Figueroa, Celebrating the Rise of Women in Diplomacy,
Diplomatic Courier: A Global Affairs Magazine, March 8, 2012, available at
http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/topics/diplomacy/1374-celebrating-the-rise-ofwomen-in-diplomacy (noting that only 11 female ambassadors served as Permanent
Representatives of their states to the United Nations in 2002 and discussing the challenges
to women in the United Kingdom’s diplomatic corps); Ann Wright, For the Record:
Breaking through Diplomacy’s Glass Ceiling, FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL 55-56 (October
2005),
available
at
http://afsa.org/sites/default/files/flipping_book/1005/files/assets/downloads/publication.pdf
(noting that rapid progress was made starting with the Carter Administration in promoting
women to chief-of-mission positions and other high level appointments, and that in 2003
only 25% of senior foreign service officers were women).
68

See supra Figures 9 and 10. Ad litem judges were first elected to the
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Furthermore, the limited pool is unconvincing because it assumes
that selection procedures aim to promote the most meritorious candidates in
the first place. This is far from obvious. For example, in preparation for
2015 elections to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Open
Society Justice Initiative established a panel of experts to evaluate
candidates nominated by states. The panel expressed concerns about
whether one of the five candidates, Patricio Pazmiño Freire, would “be in a
position to avoid conflicts of interest or to maintain the necessary
independence and impartiality with regard to the Ecuadorian executive
branch.”69 The panel noted that he was appointed to Ecuador’s
Constitutional Court after the entire body was dissolved, which a 2013
Inter-American Court decision determined violated due process norms by
arbitrary termination and impeachment proceedings against the previous
judges.70 He was elected to the bench nonetheless. On the other hand,
another judge, with a “long and deep commitment to human rights” lost his
re-election bid.71 While this could arguably constitute an exceptional case,
as discussed in more detail with reference to national nomination and
international elections procedures, several scholars of international courts
have argued that selection processes for international courts often have
more to do with “political factors, rather than the individual selection
criteria…”72 In the same vein, Philippe Sands and Cherie Booth wrote: “in
many states, nominations are handed out to reward political loyalty rather
than legal excellence.” 73 If so, the limited pool argument loses much of its
purported explanatory force.
The limited pool argument is also problematic because it appears
that the percentage of women on the bench does not necessarily correspond
with the percentage of women lawyers a state may have. In other words,
ICTR in 2004. There were ten ad litem judges on the bench in 2011. After
2011, the number of ad litem judges was reduced to 3 and then to 1, as the
tribunal sought to complete its work.
69
Final Report of the Independent Panel for the Election of InterAmerican Commissioners and Judges (2 June 2015), 25-26, available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/iachr-panelreport-eng-20150603.pdf
(last visited June 24, 2015) [hereinafter
Independent Panel Report].
70
Id. at 26.
71
Id. at 29.
72
See, e.g., SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 95;
see infra at note 302.
73
Cherie Booth & Philippe Sands, Keep Politics out of the Global
Courts, The Guardian (July 13, 2001).
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growing the pool does not necessarily translate to more women on the
bench. Although Michelson estimates that 50% of France’s lawyers are
women,74 no French woman has ever served as a permanent judge on the
European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the
International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICTR or the ICTY,
although French men have served on all of them. Michele Picard is the only
French woman to have served on any of the international courts surveyed,
as an ad litem judge on the ICTY. In the same vein, although women
account for about 48% of the United Kingdom’s lawyers according to
Michelson,75 no British woman has ever served on the European Court of
Justice, the International Criminal Court, the European Court of Human
Rights, or the ICTY, although British men have. Dame Rosalynn Higgins,
the first woman ever to serve as a permanent judge on the International
Court of Justice is British, however. On the other hand, China, which is
estimated to have about 21% female lawyers,76 has appointed women to the
International Court of Justice and the World Trade Organization’s Appellate
Body; Chinese men have served on the ICJ, the ICTY and the ICTR.
Russia has appointed no women to the European Court of Human Rights,
the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea, the ICTR and ICTY, although Russian men have served there.
Michelson estimates that 45% of Russia’s lawyers are women. 77 Only 16%
of lawyers are women in Japan,78 yet Japanese women have served on both
the ICTY and the ICC.
B. There’s an opening? The opacity of national nomination procedures
The number of women serving as international court judges in
proportion to their availability in the pool of qualified candidates raises
serious questions about the definition of the pool itself and what procedures
are utilized to identify candidates for the pool. This process generally takes
place at the national level. National nominations practices can be grouped
into three categories: (1) little to no guidance or transparency, (2) a high
level of guidance or transparency, and (3) no nominations procedure at the
national level. Most of the twelve courts surveyed fall into the first group,
while the ECHR and the ECJ fall into the second, and ECOWAS into the
third.
A comparison of these three groups’ selection procedures and
74

Michelson, supra note 47, at A6, 35.
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
75
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statistics on women’s participation does not appear to yield concrete
conclusions about the relationship between the amount of guidance
provided or the degree of transparency in national nominations procedures,
and the percentage of women judges on the bench in mid-2015 or
historically. What is clear, however, is that national nomination procedures
are frequently opaque and known only to well-connected insiders. Such
procedures not only make it more difficult for outsiders to make it to the
international election stage, but also, they raise questions about whether
selection procedures aim to seat the most meritorious candidates in the first
place.
1. Group 1: Little Guidance or Transparency
The ICJ, ICC, AfCHPR, ICTY, ICTR, WTO, ATJ, ITLOS, and
IACHR contain the least guidance on national selection procedures. The
ICJ Statute provides that a national group composed of up to four
individuals named by states parties to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
are charged with nominating candidates for the ICJ, and that the national
group “is recommended to consult its highest court of justice, its legal
faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and national
sections of international academies devoted to the study of law.”79
Interviews of individuals involved in selection, however, showed that few
actually engage in the recommended consultation.80 National groups may
nominate no more than four candidates and not more than two of them may
be of the nationality of the national group; the number of candidates
nominated by a group cannot be greater than double the number of seats to
be filled.81 There are no separate guidelines or best practices available to
states concerning domestic nominations procedures. In mid-2015, women
made up 20% of the fifteen-member bench, but women account for only 3%
of the court’s slots since establishment. Dame Rosalynn Higgins (United
Kingdom) became the first woman to serve as a judge on the ICJ in 1995.
Xue Hanquin (China) and Joan Donoghue (United States) joined the bench
in 2010, followed by Julia Sebutinde (Uganda) in 2012.
The Rome Statute of the ICC specifies that any state party may
nominate a candidate for election, and the procedure for nomination should
be the same as for the highest judicial offices of that State or by the same
procedure utilized for the International Court of Justice.82 Nominations
79

Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 4-10, 26 June 1945,
59 Stat. 1055 (1945), TS No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
80
SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 142-43.
81
ICJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 5(2).
82
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 36(4), 17 July
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must include a statement describing the candidate’s competence in criminal
law and procedure or relevant international law areas, and their language
capabilities.83 Once the Secretariat receives the nominations, it must place
them and any accompanying information on the ICC website as soon as
possible.84 While the drafters of the Rome Statute and the Assembly of
States Parties developed detailed rules concerning international elections
procedures, discussed in the section below, the same does not appear to
apply to national nominations.
The Assembly of State Parties has
encouraged states “to conduct thorough and transparent processes to
identify the best candidates,” but it has not issued guidelines as to what
procedures would be appropriate.85
During its 10th Session (2011-2012), the Assembly of State Parties
agreed on the creation of an Advisory Committee on Nominations.86
Despite its name, however, the Advisory Committee on Nominations plays
no role whatsoever in the nomination process. Rather, it evaluates whether
nominees already proposed by states meet the requirements of the Rome
Statute, and is discussed further below.87 Scholars of the ICC and the
Assembly of State Parties have expressed concerns that individual state
nomination processes lack transparency and may not be driven by merit.88
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
83
Id.
84
ICC-ASP, Sixth Session, Res. ICC-ASP/3/Res.6, para. 8 (Sept. 10,
2004) [hereinafter Procedure for nomination to ICC].
85
Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of
States Parties, ICC-ASP12/Res.8 (Advance copy) para. 27 (Nov. 27, 2013),
available
at
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-Res8-ENG.pdf
[hereinafter Strengthening the ICC].
86
Res. ICC-ASP-10-Res.5-ENG, paras. 19-20 (Dec. 21, 2011). In the
same resolution, the Assembly of the State Parties encouraged States Parties
“to conduct thorough and transparent processes to identify the best
candidates” for judgeships. Id.
87
Report of the Bureau on the Establishment of an Advisory Committee
on Nominations of judges of the International Criminal Court, Tenth
Session, U.N. Doc. ICC/ASP/10/36 (Dec. 21, 2011).
88
Strengthening the ICC, supra note 85, para. 27 (“Emphasizes the
importance of nominating and electing the most highly qualified judges in
accordance with article 36 of the Rome Statute, and for this purpose
encourages States Parties to conduct thorough and transparent processes to
identify the best candidates;”); SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra
note 20.
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39% of the judges on the ICC bench in mid-2015 were women. Women
accounted for 47% of judicial slots since its establishment.
States parties to the constitutive instrument of the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ rights may nominate up to three candidates each for
that court, two of whom must be nationals of that state and none of whom
may share the nationality of any sitting member of the court. 89 The
Protocol establishing the Court provides that “[d]ue consideration shall be
given to adequate gender representation in the nomination process,” but
provides no further guidance on national nominations.90 Interestingly, the
African Union Commission, in correspondence to states in advance of
elections taking place in June 2014, asserted that it was “mandatory” that
states propose at least one female candidate each, given the low numbers of
women on the bench. 91 Also, the Commission suggested that in their
nominations procedures, states should consider taking into account,
additional factors submitted to the AU Commission by Civil Society
organizations: a) The procedure for nomination of candidates should
be at the minimum that for appointment to the highest judicial office
in the State Party; b) States Parties should encourage the
participation of civil society, including Judicial and other State
bodies, bar associations, academic and human rights organizations
and women’s groups, in the process of selection of nominees; c)
State Parties should employ a transparent and impartial national
selection procedure in order to create public trust in the integrity of
the nomination process.92
In July 2014, one man was re-elected, and two men and one woman

89

Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights arts.
11(2) and 12, June 10, 1998, Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III)
(entered into force Jan. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Protocol to African Charter].
90
Protocol to African Charter, supra note 89, art. 12.
91
See Letter to Ministries of Foreign Affairs/External Relations of all
Member States from the African Union Commission, Reference:
BC/OLC/66.5/2954.14,
available
at
http://legal.au.int/en/sites/default/files/2954.14_Bc-olc-66.5_Eng_0.pdf.
92
Letter to Ministries of Foreign Affairs/External Relations of all
Member States from the African Union Commission, Reference:
BC/OLC/66.5/2954.14,
available
at
http://legal.au.int/en/sites/default/files/2954.14_Bc-olc-66.5_Eng_0.pdf.
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were elected to replace two men and one woman.93 In mid-2015, women
made up 18% of the bench, a number which has remained constant since its
establishment.
The Resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR provide almost no
guidance on national nominations procedures. United Nations member
states and non-member states maintaining permanent observer missions at
the United Nations may nominate up to two candidates for permanent and
four candidates for ad litem judges to the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, who meet the qualifications
requirements and are not of the same nationality as each other or as a sitting
member of the other tribunal or the appeals chamber.94 While for the
nomination of ad litem judges, states are encouraged to take “into account
the importance of a fair representation of female and male candidates,”95 no
such requirement exists for permanent judges. No other guidance is
provided as to national nominations. 11% of the permanent judges on the
ICTY were women, while 22% of the permanent judges on the ICTR were
women in mid-2015. The sole ad litem judge remaining on the ICTR was a
man, while one of three ad litem judges on the ICTY was a woman. Women
have served in 21% and 13% of the permanent judge slots on the ICTR and
the ICTY, respectively, and 35% and 41% of the ad litem slots,
respectively.
The constitutive instruments and rules of procedure (when relevant)
of ITLOS, IACHR, and ATJ say nothing about suggested or required
procedures for national nominations, beyond specifying qualifications for
judges and nationality requirements.96 For example, the Statute of the Inter93

African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, New Judges Appointed
to
the
Court,
available
at
http://www.africancourt.org/en/index.php/news/latest-news/545-new-judges-appointed-to-thecourt (last visited November 21, 2014).
94
S. C. Res. 1329, Annex I art. 13, 13bis, UN Doc S/RES/1329 (2000);
S. C. Res. 143,1 Annex I, art. 12, 12bis, UN Doc S/RES/1431 (2002).
Judges “shall be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity
who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for
appointment to the highest judicial offices. In the overall composition of the
Chambers and sections of the Trial Chambers, due account shall be taken of
the experience of the judges in criminal law, international law, including
international humanitarian law and human rights law.” Id.
95
S. C. Res. 1329, Annex I art. 13, UN Doc S/RES/1329 (2000).
96
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VI,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 [hereinafter ITLOS
Statute]; Rules of the Tribunal, 28 October 1997 (as amended on 15 March
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American Court provides that judges must be “elected in an individual
capacity from among jurists of the highest moral authority and of
recognized competence in the field of human rights, who possess the
qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions
under the law of the state of which they are nationals or of the state that
proposes them as candidates.”97
States may nominate up to two
appropriately qualified candidates to the Law of the Sea Tribunal, 98 three to
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,99 and three to the Andean
Tribunal of Justice.100 When states nominate three candidates to the InterAmerican Court, at least one must be a national of a state other than the
nominating state.101 In mid-2015, women made up 5%, 14%, and 50% of
the judges on ITLOS, IACHR, and ATJ, respectively. Elsa Kelly of
Argentina is the only woman ever to have served on ITLOS’s 21-member
bench since its establishment. For 20 of the 36 years since the IACHR’s
founding, women were absent from the bench; most recently, no women
served on the bench in 2013 and 2014. 2014 was the first year that two
women served on the ATJ simultaneously since its establishment.
States are not required to nominate members of the WTO Appellate
Body, but they may forward suggestions to the Director-General.102 The
and 21 September 2001, and on 17 March 2009), Doc. ITLOS/8, 17 March
2009; Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, OAS Res. 448
(DC-O/79), OAS Official Records OEA/Ser P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1, at 98
[hereinafter IACHR Statute]; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Court
of
Human
Rights,
2000,
available
at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/regal_ing.pdf. [hereinafter IACHR Rules of
Procedure]; American Convention on Human Rights, 22 Nov. 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. 36; OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser L/V/II 23, Doc. 21, Rev. 6 (1979);
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American HR Convention];
Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, May 26, 1969, 8 ILM 910
(1969); Treaty Creating the Andean Tribunal of Justice, May 28, 1979, 18
ILM 1203 (1979) [hereinafter ATJ Treaty].
97
IACHR Statute, supra note 96, art. 4.
98
ITLOS Statute, supra note 96, art. 4.
99
IACHR Statute, supra note 96, art. 6. When a slate of three is
proposed, at least one of the candidates must be a national of a state other
than the nominating state. Id.
100
ATJ Treaty, supra note 96, art. 7.
101
IACHR Statute, supra note 96, art. 7.
102
Establishment of the Appellate Body, Recommendations by the
Preparatory Committee for the WTO, para. 13, WT/DSB/1, approved by the
Dispute Settlement Body on February 10, 1995 (June 19, 1995) [hereinafter
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WTO DSU offers no guidance on what procedures delegations should use
in coming up with names to propose, even though the United States and the
EU always nominate candidates to fill their unofficial reserved spots on the
bench.103 The United States generally nominates at least two people when
proposing individuals to fill its unofficial spot.104 A Selection Committee
composed of the Director-General, the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement
Body, and the Chairmen of the Goods, Services, TRIPS and General
Councils then makes proposals for new members “after appropriate
consultations.” 105 Critiques have been raised concerning the increasing
politicization of the WTO AB nominating process, as well as the need to
ensure geographic diversity on the bench.106 One of seven members of the
Appellate Body was a woman in mid-2015. Women were absent from the
bench for the first eight years after it was established. Between one and
three women have served on the seven-member bench each year since then.
2. Group 2: Greater Amount of Guidance and Transparency
States appointing candidates to the ECJ have received some
guidance in the national nomination procedure since 2009.107 The Treaty of
Lisbon, which entered into force that year, added a new element to the
judicial selection procedure consisting of an advisory panel. Article 255
established a panel to “give an opinion on candidates’ suitability to perform
the duties of Judge and Advocate-General” before the governments make
their selections.108 The panel, which is appointed by the Council of the
WTO Prep Cmte Recs].
103
Ruth Mackenzie, The Selection of International Judges, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 745 (Cesare P.R.
Romano et al., eds. 2014); Joost Pauwelyn, La sélection des juges a l’OMC,
et peut-être celle d’un Chinois, mérite plus d’attention, Le Temps (16 Nov.
2007).
104
Pauwelyn, supra note 103.
105
WTO Prep Cmte Recs, supra note 102, para. 13.
106
Pauwelyn, supra note 103; see also Manfred Elsig & Mark A.
Pollack, Agents, Trustees, and international courts: The politics of judicial
appointment at the World Trade Organization, 0 EURO. J. INT’L REL. 1
(2012); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Selection Panel to Recommence Search For
Appellate Body Judge Following Deadlock, International Trade Daily:
News Archive (January 21, 2014).
107
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 221, Nov. 10,
1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
108
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 255, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) [hereinafter TFEU Treaty].
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European Union, is composed of seven members, including former
members of the Court of Justice and the General Court, members of
national supreme courts, and lawyers of recognized competence, one of
whom must be proposed by the European Parliament.109 The President of
the Court of Justice proposes six of the candidates, and the European
Parliament proposes the seventh candidate.110 Panel members serve four
year terms renewable once.111 State members propose judicial candidates to
the panel, and the panel may request additional information, holds a private
hearing with the candidate, and then prepares an opinion on the candidate’s
suitability, including a statement of reasons.112 The panel then forwards its
opinion to member state governments.113 There is no guidance on
procedures to be followed by states in generating names for the panel’s
review in the first instance. There is no election process; rather individual
states then appoint their nominees to the bench.
In mid-2015 the ECJ was composed of five women and twenty-three
men (18% women). From 1952 until 1999, no woman had ever served on
the ECJ’s bench. From 1999 until 2008, between one and three women
served on the bench. It is interesting to note that the court’s membership
increased from 15 to 27 during that period, decreasing the percentage of
women judges on the bench from 20% in 2003, to 11% in 2008. Since
2009, the number of women on the bench has fluctuated between 4 and 5,
ranging from 15% to 18% of the total bench.
The European Court of Human Rights has among the most complex
selection procedures of the world’s international courts, and the history of
the evolution in the procedures is important to understanding its current
iteration. From 1959 until 1998, the process was relatively simple.
According to the text of the original European Convention on Human
Rights, the Consultative Assembly was to elect judges to the Court from a
list of three candidates provided by Members of the Council of Europe.114
109

Id.
Id.; Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen, Between Idealism and Realism: A
Few Comparative Reflections and Proposals on the Appointment Process of
the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights Members,
Working Paper #1, 14 (May 2014).
111
European Council Decision Relating to the Operating rules of the
Panel Provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (2010/124/EU), Annex, para. 3.
112
Id. at paras. 6-8.
113
Id. at para. 8.
114
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 39, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.
110
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Candidates were to “possess high moral character and… either possess the
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be
jurisconsults of recognised competence.”115 The Court was to be composed
of one judge from each state member of the Council of Europe, and no two
judges could be nationals of the same state.116 States included no other
guidance for national nominations or qualifications requirements in the
original convention. The percentage of women judges on the bench during
this period fluctuated between 0% and 11%; it was 3% in 1998.
In preparation for the entry into force of Protocol 11, the
Parliamentary Assembly adopted resolutions, recommendations and orders
with regard to selection procedures. Judges are still elected from lists of 3
candidates submitted by each state party, by the Parliamentary Assembly,117
but a much greater focus exists on making national selection procedures
transparent and ensuring the election of qualified candidates. In 1996, the
Parliamentary Assembly committed itself to improving its procedures for
the selection of candidates, adopted a model curriculum vita to systematize
the information provided by candidates to the Parliamentary Assembly, and
it undertook to require personal interviews of candidates by one of its
committees once candidates were nominated.118 It also ordered the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to “examine the question of
the qualifications and manner of appointment of judges to the European
Court of Human Rights, with a view to achieving a balanced representation
of the sexes.”119 Between 1997 and 1998 the percentage of women on the
bench jumped from 3% to 18%. The percentage of women judges on the
court has not fallen below 17% since then.
T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter
ECHR].
115
Id., art. 39.
116
Id., art. 38.
117
Protocol 11, art. 22; European Convention on Human Rights, as
amended by Protocols 11, 14, and supplemented by Protocols 1,4, 6, 7 ,12,
13, at art. 22.
118
On the procedure for examining candidatures for the election of
judges to the European Court of Human Rights Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, Resolution 1082 (1996). Recommendation 1295
(1996) on the procedure for examining candidatures for the election of
judges to the European Court of Human Rights.
119
Procedure for examining candidatures for the election of judges to
the European Court of Human Rights, Order 519 (1996); see e.g.,
Resolution 1200 (1999), Election of judges to the European Court of
Human Rights.
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In 1999, the Parliamentary Assembly criticized national selection
procedures and proposed criteria for their improvement;120 it recommended
that the Committee of Ministers invite states to apply the following set of
criteria in the preparation of candidate lists:
i. issue a call for candidatures through the specialised press, so as to
obtain candidates who are indeed eminent jurists satisfying the
criteria laid down in Article 21, paragraph 1, of the Convention;
ii. ensure that the candidates have experience in the field of human
rights, either as practitioners or as activists in non-governmental
organisations working in this area;
iii. select candidates of both sexes in every case;
iv. ensure that the candidates are in fact fluent in either French or
English and are capable of working in one of these two languages;
v. put the names of the candidates in alphabetical order.121
In addition, the Assembly asked the Committee of Ministers to invite
member states to consult their national parliaments in the preparation of
lists to create a more transparent national selection procedure.122 Shortly
thereafter, it instructed the Sub-Committee on the Election of Judges of the
Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights to ensure that states
members apply these criteria, “and in particular the presence of candidates
of both sexes.”123 In the same vein, in 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly
emphasized the importance of an independent judiciary for the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, insisted that the appointments
process “reflect the principles of democratic procedure, the rule of law, nondiscrimination, accountability and transparency,” and it urged states to
publish their procedures.124

120

Recommendation 1429(1999), National procedures for nominating
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights.
121
Recommendation 1429(1999), National procedures for nominating
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights.
122
Id.
123
Order No. 558 (1999), National procedures for nominating
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights.
124
Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, Recommendation
1649 (2004). The Assembly’s Recommendation stated: “…it is not
satisfactory merely to assert that the gender balance of the Court reflects the
under-representation of women in the judiciary of the member states. It is
in the interest of impartiality and of the Court’s effectiveness for the
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In Resolution 1366 (2004), the Parliamentary Assembly decided it
would no longer consider lists of candidates where the areas of competence
of candidates appear “unduly restricted,” the list does not contain candidates
of both sexes, the candidates do not have sufficient knowledge of an official
language of the Court, or do not possess “the stature” to meet the
qualifications requirements enumerated in article 21 of the European
Convention.125 The Assembly emphasized its belief in the importance of
the transparency of procedures, and it decided to investigate obstacles to
nominating women at the national and European levels.126 After Malta
submitted an all-male list to the Parliamentary Assembly, it sought an
Advisory Opinion from the European Court of Human Rights on the
requirement for at least one member of the under-represented sex. As a
result of the Court’s opinion, the Assembly modified its list requirement
such that it would only consider single-sex lists where a contracting party
has “taken all necessary and appropriate steps” to obtain a list with a
candidate of the under-represented sex.127 Also, it required various bodies
of the Assembly to certify the existence of “exceptional circumstances”

Committee of Ministers, the Assembly, and the high contracting parties to
address the issue of the gender imbalance of the Court by considering –and
where necessary, improving – the procedures for the appointment of
judges.” Id. The Parliamentary Assembly then called on the Committee of
Ministers to invite member states to meet specific criteria before submitting
their candidate lists, including an open call for candidates, candidates with
experience in human rights, lists with both sexes, candidates with
knowledge of one of the official languages of the Court, and that names of
candidates be placed in alphabetical order on candidate lists. It also
encouraged the Committee to consider revising the Convention to state that
the three-candidate lists include at least one candidate of each sex. Id.,
paras. 19, 21.
125
Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, Resolution
1366 (2004).
126
Id. The Parliamentary Assembly then decided to reintroduce and
modify the rule for candidate lists such that it would no longer consider
candidates where “the list does not include at least one candidate of each
sex, except when the candidates belong to the sex which is underrepresented in the Court, that is the sex to which under 40% of the total
number of judges belong.” Candidates for the European Court of Human
Rights, Resolution 1426 (2005).
127
Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, Resolution
1627 (2008).
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permitting a list with no members of the under-represented sex.128 Since the
Advisory Opinion was issued, states have provided unisex lists on at least
two occasions.129 In 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly reiterated that
national nominations procedures must reflect principles of “democratic
procedure, transparency and non-discrimination,” it required the Assembly
to reject lists that fail to present a “real choice” among the candidates
submitted, and allowed the Assembly to reject lists not generated through
“fair, transparent and consistent” national selection procedures.130
128

Id. In the wake of the Court’s Advisory Opinion, the Assembly
modified the list requirement: “Lists of candidates should as a general rule
contain at least one candidate of each sex, unless the sex of the candidates
on the list is under-represented on the Court (under 40% of judges) or if
exceptional circumstances exist to derogate from this rule.” CM(2012)40
addendum final, 4.4 Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on the
selection of candidates for the post of judge at the European Court of
Human Rights – Explanatory Memorandum.
129
See, e.g., List and curricula vitae of candidates submitted by the
Government of the Republic of Moldova (Aug. 28 2012), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/2012/COE.PACE.WD.C
OM.13027.2012.EN.pdf (proposing three male candidates); Letter to the
Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly from the Belgian Federal
Department
of
Justice,
dated
July
7,
2011,
available
at
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=12986&lang=en (proposing three male candidates).
130
Resolution 1646 (2009), Nomination of candidates and election of
judges to the European Court of Human Rights. The Assembly again listed
best practices for selection procedures, such as open calls for candidates and
listing candidates in alphabetical order, and “strongly urge[d]” states to
establish national selection procedures “to ensure that the authority and
credibility of the court are not put at risk by ad hoc and politicised
processes” and such that those advising on selection are “themselves as
gender-balanced as possible.” Id. In 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly
specified that when a list lacks a member of the underrepresented sex, twothirds of the Sub-Committee on the Election of Judges to the European
Court of Human Rights must determine that the state proposing the list took
all “necessary and appropriate steps to ensure” that the list contained
candidates of both sexes meeting the qualifications requirements in the
European Convention, and the Parliamentary Assembly must also endorse
this position. Resolution 1841 (2011), The amendment of various
provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly –
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In 2010, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
established an Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as
Judge to the European Court of Human Rights to assist states in evaluating
candidates before they are transmitted to the Parliamentary Assembly for
consideration.131 The Panel is composed of seven members chosen from
states’ highest national courts, former judges of international courts, and
lawyers of recognized competence, by the Committee of Ministers in
consultation with the President of the Court, and the panel is supposed to be
“geographically and gender balanced.”132 States must forward to the Panel
the names and curricula vitae of intended candidates before submitting them
to the Parliamentary Assembly. If, following consultations with the
nominating state, the Panel finds that a nominee is not suitable, it will
provide that view and its reasoning confidentially to the state. When three
candidates are presented by a state to the Parliamentary Assembly, the
Panel will confidentially provide its views in writing as to whether the
candidates meet the criteria of the Convention. The first panel consisted of
two women and five men.133 In June 2014, the Committee appointed a
Panel consisting of one woman and six men.134
In addition, in 2012, the Committee of Ministers issued detailed
guidance on the selection of candidates for ECHR judgeships covering the
establishment of procedures, identification of criteria for candidates,
composition and procedures of selection bodies, and the role of the final
decision-maker to whom selection bodies report.135 The Guidelines provide
Implementation of Resolution 1822 (2011) on the reform of the
Parliamentary Assembly.
131
Resolution CM/Res(2010)26.
132
Id.
133
Establishment of the Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for
Election as Judge to the
European Court of Human Rights – Implementation, available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Del/Dec(2010)1101/1.7&Langua
ge=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&Ba
ckColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383.
134
Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for Election as Judge to the
European Court of Human Rights – Appointment of members, available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Del/Dec(2014)1202/1.7&Langua
ge=lanEnglish&Ver=original&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&Ba
ckColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383.
135
CM(2012)40 addendum final, 4.4 Guidelines of the Committee of
Ministers on the selection of candidates for the post of judge at the
European Court of Human Rights – Explanatory Memorandum, paras. 2,
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specific examples of best practices. As for the procedure for drawing up
recommended lists of candidates, the Committee noted that the composition
of selection bodies is an “essential consideration” and it should be free from
“undue influence since the composition of the final list of candidates must
not be, and must not appear to be a result of political patronage or
preference…”136 The committee that evaluates candidates after states
submit them to the Parliamentary Assembly also considers whether the state
complied with the criteria established by the Assembly, including the
presence of the under-represented sex in the list of candidates.137
Between 1999 and 2015, the percentage of women on the bench has
fluctuated between 17% in 1999 and 2000, and 40% in 2011, increasing
every year from 2000 until 2011. Since 2011, the percentages have ranged
from 33% to 36%. Women have taken up 29% of the judicial slots since
1999.
3. Group 3: No National Nomination Procedure
The ECOWAS Court has no national selection procedure at all. The
Protocol to the Community Court of Justice states that member states may
nominate up to two candidates each, and then Heads of State of member
states vote on the nominees.138 In 2006, States reformed the judicial
selection procedure to give national judges a greater voice in the selection
of judges to ECOWAS through a Community Judicial Council, composed
of chief justices of states without representation on the Court.139 The reform
was instituted, also, to “ensure that the Court is endowed with the best
qualified and competent persons to contribute, by virtue of their quality and
experience” to the development of Community law.140 When it is a state’s
turn to have a judge sit on the Court, the Council initiates a competitive
selection process by advertising the vacancies and required qualifications in
the Official Gazette of the Community and widely circulated national
15, 16.
136

Id., para. 48.
Evaluation of the implementation of the reform of the Parliamentary
Assembly, Resolution 2002 (2014), paras. 9 &10, Appendix.
138
Protocol A/P.1/7/91 on the Community Court of Justice art. 3, July 6,
1991 [hereinafter 1991 Protocol].
139
Karen J. Alter et al., A New International Human Rights Court for
West Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, 107 AM. J. INT’L
L. 737, 760 (2013).
140
ECOWAS Newsletter, 4 (October 2006), available at
http://www.ecowas.int/publications/en/newsletter/ECOWAS_NewsLetter_0
1-Eng.pdf (last visited November 12, 2014).
137
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gazettes and newspapers.141 The Council collects the applications, narrows
down the applications to three per state, interviews the three candidates per
state, and then recommends one to the Authority.142 Interestingly, it
appears that the home state of the candidate is no longer formally involved
in the nomination process for its candidates to the Court, although
candidates without a state’s support are unlikely to survive the Authority’s
vote.143 Although, after the Court lost one of its seven judges, women made
up 50% of the bench in 2012 and 2013, by mid-2015, only one woman was
serving on the 7 member bench.
4. Conclusions on National Nominations
When courts are grouped by the amount of guidance provided to
states on national nominations procedures, no clear pattern in the data on
sex representativeness emerges. ECOWAS dropped from 50% to 14%,
even though its national nomination procedure appears quite
comprehensive, open and focused on merit. The ICJ’s percentage of female
judges has increased from 0% to 20%, but there has been no apparent
corresponding change to national selection procedures. The ICC has a
relatively high number of female judges, but little in the way of guidance
for national selection procedures. The ECJ has had an advisory committee
on nominations since 2009, but the percentage of female judges is still quite
low. On the other hand, the Court with the greatest amount of guidance on
national nomination procedures, the ECHR, shows a strong upward trend in
female participation. Since the Parliamentary Assembly began emphasizing
open and merit-based selection procedures, the percentage of female judges
has increased dramatically.
A number of factors make conclusions difficult to draw about the
relationship between national nomination procedures and sex
representativeness. First, the sample size of twelve courts is relatively
small. Second, to some extent, the comparison is one of apples and
oranges. Procedures differ across courts, and sometimes suggested or even
required guidelines or procedures are not rigorously complied with. Also,
141

MOJEED OLUJINMI ABEFE ALABI, ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE
ECOWAS COURT IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA 147 (Thesis
submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of
Leicester) (2013). An advertisement for a judicial position was even posted
on an internet job site: http://m.ngcareers.com/job/2013-10/judge-atnational-judicial-council#sthash.GlX3Q2vd.sVzCrGir.dpbs
(last visited
November 14, 2014).
142
Id. at 148.
143
Id. at 148-49.
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looking only at national nominations leaves out what happens at the
international elections stage, when such a stage exists. Finally, it excludes
sex representativeness requirements or aspirations found in a few courts’
statutes. What does emerge from the comparison, however, is that, with a
few notable exceptions, the vast majority of the courts surveyed have
surprisingly little concrete instruction to states at the national nomination
stage. Nor are their procedures transparent.
The lack of a transparent procedure for selecting judges on most
courts makes it easier for selectors to define the pool of acceptable
candidates narrowly and in a way that may benefit them personally.
Individuals may select a particular nominee because it will help them gain a
professional advantage in the future, or the nominee’s pedigree may
correspond with the selector’s own understanding of merit, based on the
selector’s own professional choices. It benefits an Oxford graduate to name
other Oxford graduates to positions of power because it enhances her own
credentials. It may benefit a lawyer to push his client to name a particular
individual as ad hoc judge to the International Court of Justice in the hopes
that the newly named judge will become a friendly professional
acquaintance and reciprocate in some way in the future. Bryant Garth and
Yves Dezalay made a similar point in the context of international
commercial arbitration: arbitrators and would be arbitrators “promote the
forms of symbolic capital that give maximum value to their personal
characteristics, but also they try to build symbolic capital that will allow
them to prosper and succeed in the changing environment.”144 Access to
the kinds of experiences that build symbolic capital or prestige may itself be
conditioned upon the same incentives to exclude newcomers or individuals
with non-traditional backgrounds, as well as flawed selection procedures.
For example, four of the last five judges elected to the ICJ were previously
members of the International Law Commission,145 but very few women
have ever served on that body; only 2 of 34 members elected in 2011 were
women.146
Further, opaque nomination procedures are likely to make it more
difficult for less well connected potential candidates to be aware of
144

YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 10, 18 n. 7 (1996).
145
Dapo Akande, Patrick Robinson of Jamaica Elected to the ICJ
(November 19, 2014), at http://www.ejiltalk.org/patrick-robinson-ofjamaica-elected-to-the-icj/.
146
Membership, International Law Commission (2012-2016), at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
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openings. In a recent book, Ruth Mackenzie, Kate Malleson, Penny Martin
and Philippe Sands conducted a series of interviews about selection
procedures for the ICJ and the ICC; they determined that “few wellinformed insiders appear to be familiar with the details,” and “significant
variations in practice from one judicial nomination to another frequently
occur.”147 Processes varied substantially from state to state, although most
states used “informal” nomination processes, sometimes consisting of
discussions among a few individuals, followed by decisions by powerful
insiders.148 Individuals known to the decision-makers and who lobby for the
position are most likely to succeed.149 A few states appeared to have more
structured and transparent procedures, but these were relatively rare.150
Overall, processes were “marked by their lack of transparency and
accountability and a stronger likelihood of being informed by extraneous
political considerations. The resulting selection pool was small, there was
limited outside input into the selection process, and political factors, rather
than the individual selection criteria, could determine nominations.”151 In
the same vein, in describing the selection of nominees for international
courts more generally, Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano and Leigh
Swigart wrote:
In general, one cannot apply to become an international judge. Most
of the time one is called. It is not only a matter of having the right
skills and experience, but most of all a matter of being on the radar
screen of, and appreciated by, one’s own government, particularly
by some key civil servants.152
Similarly, in their interviews of international commercial arbitrators,
Dezalay and Garth were told that “It’s a mafia because people appoint one
another. You always appoint your friends—people you know,” and “[i]t is
a club. They nominate one another. And sometimes you’re counsel, and
sometimes you’re arbitrator.”153 It is difficult for outsiders to break into the
147

SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 64.
Id. at 64.
149
Id. at 65.
150
Id.
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Id. at 95.
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TERRIS, ET AL., supra note 10, at 23. One individual described the
process of nominating judges to the ICJ and the ICC as “very direct and
personal and not very institutional-like, [more] a friendship thing.”
SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 86.
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club if they lack information about opportunities or if there are no apparent
application procedures. And the lack of transparency at the national
nomination level precludes accountability or oversight at the domestic level
by constituencies who might push for greater diversity or more structured
procedures.
In summary, the opacity of national nominations procedures may
play a role in reducing potential sex representativeness on the bench.
Without information about available positions and opaque procedures,
individuals or groups with fewer connections to nominators may simply not
be aware of openings or choose to refrain from applying if they believe
decisions have already been made. Insiders doing the selection have
incentives to validate their own qualifications as they nominate new
candidates, and the lack of transparency precludes public accountability.
C. Elections – May the Best Candidate Win?
Once a candidate is nominated for an international judgeship, she
usually must survive election by states in an international body, although
not in every case. For example, individual states appoint their judges to the
ECJ. Just as with national nominations, the drafters of the constitutive
instruments of international courts have provided varying degrees of
direction to states on voting at the international level, in the form of
statutory mandates or aspirations, or institutionalized screening mechanisms
to evaluate candidates’ qualifications or rank candidates. It appears that
courts with a high degree of direction, either in the form of express
instructions about how to vote or institutionalized screening mechanisms
tend to have higher percentages of women judges on the bench. The courts
with the greatest amount of direction to states at the international selection
phase, as well as screening mechanisms, are the International Criminal
Court and the European Court of Human Rights. These are followed by a
second group, which includes ECOWAS and the WTO Appellate Body;
both courts have screening committees, but little statutory guidance on
selecting among candidates. The third group has no institutionalized
screening and some statutory guidance, and it includes the AfCHPR, the
ICTY and the ICTR. The remainder of the courts – the IACHR, ICJ,
ITLOS, and the ATJ – provide the least amount of statutory direction and
no institutionalized screening mechanism at the international level. The
group with the least amount of statutory direction and no institutionalized
screening mechanisms had among the lowest number of women judges
historically and the group with the highest amount of screening and
direction had a greater proportion of women on the bench.
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1. Group 1: Quotas and Screening
States are provided the most guidance as to how to select among
nominees in the International Criminal Court. First, the Statute requires that
no two judges be nationals of the same state,154 and that state parties must
consider the need for representation of the principal legal systems of the
world, equitable geographical representation, and “a fair representation of
female and male judges.”155 They must consider, too, the need to include
judges with legal expertise on specific issues such as violence against
women or children.156 The President of the Assembly of States Parties may
extend the nomination period up to six weeks if regional or gender
minimum voting requirements are not matched with at least twice the
number of candidates fulfilling the requirement.157
Judges are elected at a meeting of the Assembly of State Parties by
secret ballot.158 The persons elected are the candidates who obtain the
highest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of the States present and
voting.159 Two lists of candidates are generated in advance of the vote. List
A contains candidates with criminal law and procedure expertise, while List
B contains candidates with relevant international law knowledge.160 States
are instructed to vote such that at least 9 and no more than 13 candidates
from list A and at least 5 and no more than 9 candidates from list B are
seated on the Court at all times.161 Further, each state party is required to
vote for a minimum number of candidates from each regional group and of
each gender, and the required number of votes decreases depending on the
number of candidates available and the number of judges meeting those
requirements remaining on the bench.162 Only ballots complying with the
voting requirements are valid.163 Elections continue until all spots are
filled.
The Assembly of State Parties created an Advisory Committee on
Nominations to assist states in vetting nominees for judgeships in 2011.164
154
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The Advisory Committee evaluates whether nominees proposed by states
meet the requirements of the Rome Statute.165 Despite a mandate for
geographically and gender diverse membership, the Assembly of State
Parties ultimately elected a geographically diverse group of eight men and
one woman to serve on the Committee in October 2012.166 The Committee
has conducted interviews with nominees and reached conclusions about
their proficiencies in the working languages of the Court and the extent of
their relevant knowledge and experience.167 A candidate whose
qualifications were questioned by the Advisory Committee was not elected
to the bench in 2013.168 Of all the courts surveyed, the ICC has had the
highest percentage of women judges of surveyed courts, reaching 61% in
2009, and at or exceeding 39% for its entire existence.
Like the ICC, the ECHR too has an institutional mechanism for
reviewing candidates before they are voted on by the Parliamentary
Assembly, in addition to the Advisory Panel of Experts on Candidates for
Election as Judge to the ECHR created by the Council of Ministers to
advise states parties before naming nominees, discussed above. In 1996,
the Assembly requested that states utilize a standardized CV to facilitate the
comparison of candidates, and it expressed its expectation that the SubCommittee on Human Rights or an ad hoc sub-committee of the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights would interview all candidates on
same resolution, the Assembly of the State Parties encouraged States Parties
“to conduct thorough and transparent processes to identify the best
candidates” for judgeships. Id.
165
Report of the Bureau on the Establishment of an Advisory
Committee on Nominations of judges of the International Criminal Court,
Tenth Session, U.N. Doc. ICC/ASP/10/36 (Dec. 21, 2011).
166
Election of the Advisory Committee on Nominations – 2012
Nomination, International Criminal Court, available at http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/elections/advisorycommitteenominations/Pages/electi
on%20acn-%202012.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
167
Report of the Advisory Committee on Nomination of Judges on the
work of its Second Meeting, Twelfth Session, U.N. Doc. ICC/ASP/12/47,
Para.
10
(Oct.
29,
2013)
available
at
http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-47-ENG.pdf.; Id., Annex 2.
168
Id.; Current Judges, International Criminal Court, available at
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/chambers/the%20jud
ges/Pages/the%20judges%20%20%20biographical%20notes.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2014) (listing Judge Geoffrey A. Henderson as a sitting
judge of the ICC).
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behalf the Parliamentary Assembly.169 The sub-committee’s conclusions
were then forwarded to the Assembly before the vote.170 As of January
2015, the Subcommittee will be replaced by a Committee on the Election of
Judges to the European Court of Human Rights. 171 The new committee,
composed of twenty people, is charged with studying the standardized CVs
of all candidates, interviewing candidates, preparing a report to the
Assembly with a recommendation and a ranking of candidates, along with
the reasons for its recommendations and rankings, and seeking to ensure
that the nominating state complied with the Assembly’s criteria for the
establishment of lists, “and in particular the presence of candidates of both
sexes.”172 The committee may also report to the Assembly on any questions
related to the national selection procedure.173 Any decision to reject a list of
candidates or to consider a single-sex list of candidates requires a two-thirds
majority of votes cast.174 When the committee chooses to recommend
rejection of a list, it must provide its reasons to the Assembly.175
Committee members are expected to have “appropriate knowledge or
practical experience in the legal field.”176 Women have accounted for
between 33% and 40% of the bench for the period of 2008 to 2015, among
the highest percentages for all the courts surveyed.
2. Group 2: Screening and Ranking, But Little Statutory Guidance
169

On the procedure for examining candidatures for the election of
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Sess.,
Res.
1082
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ECOWAS and the WTO Appellate Body have screening and
ranking committees, but little statutory guidance to states about how to
select among candidates. At ECOWAS, the Community Judicial Council
composed of chief justices of states without representation on the Court is
charged with ensuring that the Court is endowed with the best qualified and
competent persons to contribute, by virtue of their quality and experience”
to the development of Community law.177 The Council not only collects
applications, but also, it narrows down the applications to three per state,
interviews the three candidates per state, and then recommends one
candidate to states for a vote.178
The WTO appears to have a relatively rigorous vetting procedure
before states vote on members of the Appellate Body. Once states propose
candidates, a Selection Committee composed of the Director-General, the
Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body, and the Chairmen of the Goods,
Services, TRIPS and General Councils makes proposals for new
members.179 The Selection Committee requires candidates to take a written
exam and to participate in an interview process.180 Then, member states
vote on the proposed slate of candidates.181 Most, if not all of the time,
candidates proposed by the Selection Committee are elected. 182 Despite the
apparently in-depth interview process in the Committee, some have
criticized the late announcement of candidates by the Committee to the
public, and a corresponding lack of public debate about potential
candidates.183 In early 2014, elections were delayed after the Committee
deadlocked over whom to propose, in response to pressure from African
countries for an African member of the Body, and US opposition to the
proposed candidates.184
177

Alter et al., supra note 139, at 760. ECOWAS Newsletter, 4 (October
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1-Eng.pdf (last visited November 12, 2014).
178
ABEFE ALABI, supra note 141, at 148.
179
WTO Prep Cmte Recs, supra note 102,para. 13.
180
Pauwelyn, supra note 103.
181
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 31, art. 17. Appellate
Body
Members,
World
Trade
Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm
(last visited June 11, 2014).
182
Pauwelyn, supra note 103.
183
Id.
184
Pruzin, supra note 106.

7-Sep-15]

SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING

53

In mid-2015, 14% of sitting ECOWAS judges were women, and
14% of Appellate Body members were women in mid-2015. One out of
seven judges on each bench was a woman. Women have occupied 14% of
Appellate Body member slots since its establishment, while women
accountted for 40% of ECOWAS judgeships since establishment.
3. Group 3: Some Statutory Guidance, But No Screening
Once state nominees to the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights arrive at the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
African Union, states elect judges to the court by secret ballot.185 The
Assembly must ensure that “there is representation of the main regions of
Africa and of their principal legal traditions,” as well as “adequate gender
representation.”186 There is no formal nominating commission or advisory
panel required in the nomination of judges at the national level or for
vetting candidates once nominated.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations forwards nominees for
permanent judgeships to the ICTY and the ICTR to the Security Council,
which then establishes a list of candidates, “taking due account of the
adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the world.”187 No
additional guidance is provided as to how the Security Council creates the
list of candidates from the names forwarded to it. The General Assembly
then votes on the candidates provided by the Security Council; if two
candidates of the same nationality receive more than an absolute majority of
votes, the one with the greater number of votes will win.188 The constitutive
instruments also state that “[i]n the overall composition of the Chambers
and sections of the Trial Chambers, due account shall be taken of the
experience of the judges in criminal law, international law, including
international humanitarian law and human rights law.”189 For ad litem
judges, once states have nominated candidates “taking into account the
importance of a fair representation of female and male candidates,” the
Secretary-General forwards the nominees to the Security Council, which
establishes a list of candidates “taking due account of the adequate
representation of the principal legal systems of the world and bearing in
185
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mind the importance of equitable geographical distribution.”190 Then,
whichever candidates receive an absolute majority of votes of the General
Assembly are elected.191
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was composed of
18% women judges in mid-2015. Women have occupied two of the 11
positions on that court every year since its establishment. In mid-2015, the
ICTY and the ICTR had 11% and 22% female permanent judges,
respectively, and 0% (0 out of 1) and 33% (1 out of 3), ad litem judges,
respectively. On the ICTY, women occupied ad litem slots 41% of the
time since establishment, and 13% of the permanent slots.192 On the ICTR,
women occupied ad litem slots 35% of the time, and permanent slots 21%
of the time.
4. Group 4: No Screening and Little Statutory Guidance
There are no institutional mechanisms for evaluating or ranking
nominees at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Andean Tribunal of Justice, or the ICJ,
although they do have some requirements for voting related to geographic
distribution of judges. After states nominate candidates to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, parties to the American Convention on
Human Rights vote by secret ballot on the candidates.193 No two judges can
be nationals of the same state.194 Nonetheless, in 2015, the Open Society
Justice Initiative, supported by over 70 non-governmental organizations,
convened a panel of independent experts to review and comment on
candidates for the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human
Rights.195 The panel surveyed the application materials, asked candidates to
190
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complete a questionnaire, looked at publicly available information on each
candidate, and opined on the suitability of the various candidates. 196 For the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, after states nominate
candidates, states parties vote by secret ballot as well. To be elected,
nominees must obtain the largest number of votes and a two-thirds majority
of states present and voting, so long as the majority includes a majority of
states parties.197 No two members of the tribunal can share nationality, and
there must be at least three members from each geographical group
established by the United Nations General Assembly.198 The ITLOS Statute
also provides that “[i]n the Tribunal as a whole the representation of the
principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution
shall be assured.”199
Once states nominate candidates to the ICJ, the General Assembly
and the Security Council independently vote on the candidates.200
Candidates who receive an absolute majority of votes in both chambers are
elected.201 Traditionally, candidates proposed by the permanent members
of the Security Council always get elected.202 States may not elect two
nationals of the same state.203 The ICJ Statute provides that “electors shall
bear in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually
possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the
representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal
systems of the world should be assured.”204 For the Andean Tribunal of
Justice, each state nominates three candidates, and then each judge must be
Panel Will Monitor Election of Inter-American Human Rights
Commissioners and Judges (April 29, 2015), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/press-releases/new-independentpanel-will-monitor-election-inter-american-human-rights-commissioners.
196
See Independent Panel Report, supra note 69.
197
ITLOS Statute, supra note 96, art. 4.
198
Id., art. 3
199
Id., art. 2. There is no vote required for ad hoc judges appointed by
states when relevant. ITLOS, art. 17.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
MACKENZIE ET AL., THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 7 (2010).
203
ICJ Statute, supra note 79, art. 3. Ad hoc judges are appointed by
states without a vote, but “[s]uch person shall be chosen preferably from
among those persons who have been nominated as candidates” to
permanent judge positions. Id., art. 9.
204
Id., art. 9.
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unanimously selected by all four contracting parties.205 No commission is
involved in vetting candidates or providing guidelines to states in voting at
the international level.
These courts have among the lowest numbers of women on the
bench historically. Women have occupied following percentage of slots on
these courts: IACHR – 10%, ITLOS – 2%, the ICJ – 3%, the Andean
Tribunal – 12%, and the AfCHPR – 18%. Nonetheless, the Andean
Tribunal currently has 50% women judges on its four-member bench.
***
Just as reading constitutive instruments alone does not provide a
complete picture of national nominations procedures, neither does a survey
of formal elections procedures at the international level. Despite the highminded qualifications language found in many courts’ founding documents,
states’ decisions about whom to vote for appear to be rooted in political
horse-trading, rather than merit.206 In a study of judges on the ICTY and
ICTR, Michael Bohlander determined that eight out of 25 judges at the
ICTY and the appeals chamber shared with the ICTR had no prior criminal
judicial experience, many of them had no experience in international
criminal law, and many did not have even fifteen years of relevant
professional experience.207 In the same vein, the International Bar
Association expressed concerns that, for many courts, “there is no prior
consideration of whether candidates for appointment to international
judicial office conform to the requirements for appointment according to
any stated criteria.”208 And seats on international benches are often seen as
“bargaining chips in the diplomatic process,” where individuals receive
votes because of the lobbying efforts and power of their states, not because
of their individual achievements.209 Scholars have noted states’ difficulty in
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ATJ Treaty, supra note 96, art. 7.
TERRIS ET AL., supra note 10, at 34 ; SELECTING INTERNATIONAL
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Michael Bohlander, The International Criminal Judiciary –
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONS
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verifying independently the qualifications of proposed candidates.210
Political factors appear to play “the important, if not central, role” in
elections, at least where the ICJ and the ICC are concerned.211 The
International Bar Association summarized the state of play with respect to
international court and tribunal elections succinctly: “Geopolitical
considerations – rather than objective merits, experience, qualifications and
personal qualities of the candidates – predominate in the final process.”212
To what extent does this lack of emphasis on qualifications and
merit at the international level potentially affect diversity on the bench? By
the time states are voting, the candidates have already been nominated. Yet
a comparison of procedures to elect judges at the international level
suggests that courts with institutionalized screening procedures may have
greater numbers of women on the bench. Three of the four courts that
utilize committees to screen candidates had relatively high numbers of
female judges in mid-2015, or high percentages of slots allocated to women
since 1999, or since establishment, whichever came later. These include the
ICC (39%, 47%), the ECHR (33%, 29%), and ECOWAS (14%, 40%). The
WTO Appellate Body, however, had only 14% women judges in mid-2015,
and 17% of judicial slots went to women. The courts with the lowest
percentages of slots allocated to women since establishment included those
with the least amount of institutional screening, such as the IACHR (10%),
ITLOS (2%), the ICJ (3%), and the Andean Tribunal of Justice (12%).
Women have served in only six percent of available slots on the ECJ, which
has no international voting procedure at all. Although it is difficult to
disentangle national nominations procedures, screening mechanisms, and
emphasis on equal representation on the bench in constitutive instruments,
the data suggest a correlation may exist between institutionalized screening
and guidance at the international voting stage and a more sex representative
bench.
The extent to which non-governmental organizations and other
stakeholders are involved in the screening of candidates and the degree of
candidate information accessible to the public may also affect the
composition of the bench. A systematic study of NGOs’ role in
international judicial selection procedures is necessary to better understand
their effect. Nonetheless, NGOs appear to be involved in screening
candidates when information is available to them. For example, the
Coalition for the International Criminal Court has provided its own
questionnaire to ICC candidates, interviewed candidates, and held public
210
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events with candidates and experts and public debates among the candidates
“to expand on their respective qualifications and expertise, as well as to
promote fully-informed decision-making by States Parties delegates.”213
Other NGOs have pushed for greater transparency and procedures at the
national nomination and international levels. For example, Human Rights
Watch complained about the selection procedures utilized by Russia in
generating its list of candidates for the ECHR in 2012.214 Civil society
organizations urged states to use more rigorous, open, transparent and
participatory procedures in national nominations to the African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights.215 The Open Society Justice Initiative and over
70 NGOs have pushed for greater transparency and screening of InterAmerican Court candidates.216 Others have complained that the late listing
of WTO Appellate Body member candidates precludes substantive public
debate about their merits.217
D. Sex Representation Requirements
What about sex representation aspirations or requirements at the
national nomination or international election levels? Aspirational statements
encouraging states to nominate both men and women may not be as
successful as mandates to do so. For example, states parties to the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights are supposed to give “[d]ue
consideration” to “adequate gender representation in the nomination
process.” 218 But no binding statutory guidance explains to states how they
should implement this mandate, and it is doubtful whether states are taking
to heart the African Union Commission’s suggestions to include civil
society and enhance transparency, or even to nominate women in the first
place. The percentage of women judges on the court has been stuck at 18%
213
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since its establishment through 2015.
On the other hand, 41% of ad litem judicial slots on the ICTY have
gone to women, while women have occupied only 13% of permanent judge
spots. The numbers are 35% and 21%, respectively, for the ICTR. States
are required to take into account the need for a fair representation of both
sexes only with respect to ad litem judges, suggesting that the
representativeness requirement at the national nomination stage may make a
difference. Like the African Court, however, no guidance exists as to how
this mandate should be implemented. The historical data on these courts,
found at Figures 9 and 10, appears compelling, nonetheless. It shows that
since ad litem judges were added to the ICTY in 2001, women have always
served in a significantly higher percentage of ad litem positions than
permanent ones. Similarly, women accounted for a greater percentage of ad
litem than permanent judges on the ICTR, almost every year since ad litem
judges were added in 2004, and until the number of ad litem judges was
reduced to only one in 2013.
Mandatory or virtually mandatory requirements to include both
sexes at the bench appear to correlate with a dramatically higher percentage
of women on the bench. Women have made up at least 39% of the
International Criminal Court every year since its establishment, and the ICC
has what amounts to a quota requirement at the international election stage.
As for the European Court of Human Rights, almost immediately after the
Parliamentary Assembly began drawing states’ attention to the issue of sex
representation on the bench in 1996, the number of women elected rose
dramatically. The percentage of women judges jumped from 3% to 18%
between 1997 and 1998. Then, shortly after the Parliamentary Assembly
invited the Committee of Ministers to encourage states to apply a set of
criteria to national nominations in 1999, including open calls for candidates,
experience in human rights, and candidates of both sexes, 219 the percentage
of women judges again increased, this time, from 17% in 1999 and 2000, to
22% in 2001. This jump coincided with a Parliamentary Assembly
instruction to the relevant Parliamentary Assembly subcommittee on
elections to ensure that member states apply the stated criteria. 220 In 2004,
the Parliamentary Assembly decided it would no longer consider unisex
lists of candidates; 221 the percentage of women judges rose from 23% in
219

Recommendation 1429(1999), National procedures for nominating
candidates for election to the European Court of Human Rights.
220
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2004 to 40% seven years later. Although Malta challenged the list
requirement and states have submitted unisex male lists on at least two
occasions, 222 the percentage of women judges has not dropped below 33%
since 2008, four years after the requirement was imposed.
Figure 15 shows the percentage of slots per year filled by women
judges from 1999 to 2015, or since establishment until 2015, if the Court
was founded after 1999. Interestingly, of the five courts with the highest
percentages of slots allocated to women, four had either quotas or
aspirational language to include women on the bench: the ICC, the ICTY
for ad litem judges, the ICTR for ad litem judges, and the ECHR. Of the
seven courts with the lowest percentages of slots going to women, none had
quotas or aspirational language seeking a fair representation of women on
the bench.
Figure 15. Percentage slots allocated to women from 1999 to
2015 (or establishment to 2015 if established after 1999)
ICC
ICTY - ad litem
ECOWAS
ICTR - ad litem
ECHR
ICTR - Perm
AfCHPR
WTO - AB
ATJ
IACHR
ECJ
ICTY - Perm
ICJ
ITLOS
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Government of the Republic of Moldova (28 Aug. 2012), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/2012/COE.PACE.WD.C
OM.13027.2012.EN.pdf (proposing three male candidates); Letter to the
Secretary General of the Parliamentary Assembly from the Belgian Federal
Department
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dated
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Table 2 shows the percentage of women judges on international courts
in mid-2015, comparing courts with sex representation requirements or
aspirational language. Table 3 shows those courts without such
requirements. While women account for 15% of judges on courts without
sex representation requirements, they make up 32% of judges on courts
with such requirements or aspirational language
Table 2. Female Participation on Courts
Representativeness Requirements (mid-2015)
ICJ ITLO IACH ECJ ATJ ECOW WT ICT
S
R
AS
O
R
AB
per
m.
3/1 1/21 1/7
5/28 2/4
1/7
1/7
2/9
5
=5% =
=18 =50 =14%
=14 per
=
14%
%
%
%
m. =
20
22%
%

Table 3. Female Participation
Requirements (mid-2015)
ICC
ICTY ad ICTR ad
litem
litem
7/18
1/3
0/1
= 39%
= 25%
= 0%

without
ICT
Y
per
m.
2/19
per
m.
=
11%

Sex

Total

18/11
7=
15%

on Courts with Representativeness
ECHR
15/45
= 33%

Af.
HPR
2/11
=18%

Ct Total
25/78=
32%

Although, due to the small number of courts involved, these
comparisons are not statistically significant, they provide compelling
circumstantial evidence that quotas and aspirational language may make a
difference in getting women on the bench. At the same time, two of the five
courts with sex representation requirements, the ICC and the ECHR, also
happen to have among the most guidance and screening at the international
election level, and the ECHR provides meaningful instruction to states at
the national nomination stage. Also, ECOWAS and the WTO appear to
have screening and ranking before elections take place, yet the percentage
of women judges was relatively low on both courts’ benches in mid-2015.
Nonetheless, 40% of slots have gone to women on ECOWAS since it was
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established. 17% have gone to women on the WTO Appellate Body since
establishment.
E. Summarizing the Reasons for the Paucity of Women on the Bench
The limited pool argument does not adequately explain the paucity
of women judges on international courts. It assumes that selection
procedures are implemented to select the most meritorious candidates, yet
ample evidence exists that political horse-trading, political patronage and
other considerations may trump. Also, given the low number of
international judgeships available, only a small pool of women is necessary
to achieve parity on the bench. Finally, states that appear to have greater
pools do not necessarily nominate more women than states with smaller
pools, suggesting that something other than the pool is playing a significant
role in judicial nominations. Opaque nominations procedures at the
national level likely create obstacles for less well-connected or “outsider”
candidates to make it through to the next stage of the elections process.
Despite the political nature of elections at the international level, courts
with institutional screening mechanisms may draw greater numbers of
women to the bench. Finally, courts with explicit requirements for sex
representativeness have been more successful at achieving it than courts
without such provisions.
Other factors aside from or instead of national nomination
procedures, institutional screening mechanisms, and representativeness
mandates may also be at play, particularly with regard to historical
statistics. These may include when the court was established, changes in
attitudes toward women, and greater participation in the workforce over
time. Since fewer women were qualified to serve as judges in the 1950s
than today, older courts would appear more likely to have fewer women as
a percentage of the bench since establishment. Also, all the courts with
representativeness mandates or aspirations began functioning after 1990,
excluding the ECHR, where a sex representation requirement was instituted
in 2004. Nonetheless, ITLOS is among the younger courts, and it has
among the lowest percentages of women on the bench historically.
Interestingly, all courts with representativeness requirements are
human rights or international criminal courts, raising the question whether
subject matter jurisdiction might make some sort of difference, rather than
statutory language. Just as states are happy to appoint a plethora of women
to the CEDAW monitoring body, perhaps states are more willing to
nominate and vote for women candidates on courts deciding international
human rights and criminal law issues, which may be perceived to implicate
what may be deemed “women’s concerns.” On the other hand, perhaps the
willingness exists in theory alone: the Inter-American Court of Human
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Rights has only one woman on the bench, and the African Court appears to
be stuck at a maximum of two.
A lack of state and domestic constituencies’ commitment to
diversity on international court benches may, too, contribute to keeping
benches homogeneous. While such a disposition may have helped to
diversify the United States federal judiciary,223 it is not readily discernable
at the international level for many international courts. In their interviews
of judges and individuals involved in judicial selection for the International
Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, Mackenzie and her
colleagues found that interviewees expressed mixed views about the
importance of sex representation on the bench. One questioned the need for
emphasizing gender given the increased enrollment of women on law
faculties in the West. Others expressed concerns that appointing female
candidates would result in a drop in quality of judges. Still others
challenged the use of the gender quotas on the ICC, suggesting that it was
unfair that seven seats went to women in the first ICC election. While the
requirements for legal, linguistic and geographical diversity were widely
accepted, “attitudes towards gender balance are generally much more
ambivalent.”224
Minimal direct advocacy on the issue of sex representation on most
international courts historically may be to blame for ambivalence about the
paucity of women on the bench. In discussing President Carter’s historic
advancement of women on the federal judicial bench in the US, Sally
Kenney proposed that change occurs when people mobilize, especially
strategically placed insiders collaborating with outside groups.225 Perhaps
the same applies to the inclusion of women judges on the International
Criminal Court.
The reason the Rome Statute has a gender
representativeness requirement is because groups advocated vigorously for
it.226 Interest groups argued that the ICTY, founded in the wake of over ten
thousand rapes in the former Yugoslavia, should have had more women on
the bench.227 They suggested that the presence of people like Navanethem
223

See, e.g., SALLY KENNEY, GENDER & JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE
JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER (2013) (arguing that Carter’s advancement of
women on the federal judicial bench was driven primarily by mobilization
by strategically placed insiders collaborating with outside groups).
224
SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES, supra note 20, at 48-49.
225
KENNEY, supra note 223, at 65.
226
Nienke Grossman, Sex Representation on the Bench and the
Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 643,
650 (2011) [hereinafter Grossman IV].
227
Id.

64

SHATTERING THE GLASS CEILING

[1-Aug-15

Pillay on the ICTR made a difference in the development of international
criminal law, and that it was essential that the ICC have women’s voices on
it, not just experts on violence against women and children.228 Arguably,
the ICC has had such high representation of women judges because NGOs
and sympathetic states pushed for the for the “fair representation”
requirement in the statute and NGOs “made extensive efforts to bring
forward the names of women who met the election requirements,
particularly from those countries that had little diplomatic leverage to get
one of their nationals elected. Once some of these women were nominated,
NGOs vigorously lobbied states to elect them.”229
Domestic constituencies may pay little attention to the percentage of
women judges on international courts due to a lack of knowledge of and
interest in their activities. Simply, people are more likely to know and care
about courts in their own communities than in far-flung places across the
world, with little perceived significance for their daily lives. Consequently,
individuals vetting, nominating and electing judges on behalf of states face
little domestic political pressure to propose or vote for a diverse slate of
candidates. The lack of transparency around nominations and elections also
serves to shield officials from the public view on this issue. While domestic
constituencies may push for the inclusion of women on domestic benches,
they may be unaware that selection is even taking place for international
ones.
Perhaps calls for more representative benches are beginning to grow
louder, at least for some courts. More people are studying and questioning
extreme sex unrepresentativeness on international commercial and
investment treaty arbitral panels.230 Non-governmental organizations such
as the Center for Justice and International Law, are organizing events
around the selection and nomination processes at the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights. Other groups, such as the International Association of
Women Judges, foster networks of women judges from around the world
and share information about vacancies when they are announced. On the
other hand, it is rare to hear people decrying the paucity of women judges
on the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or the WTO Appellate
Body.
III.
228
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Opaque and closed selection procedures at the national nomination
and international elections levels, political horse-trading, and a lack of
advocacy around and sunlight on the issue of representativeness on the
bench are likely facilitating sex unrepresentativeness on most international
court benches. In light of these conclusions, what reforms to judicial
selection procedures would increase sex representativeness on international
benches? This Part proposes methods for enhancing openness and
transparency at the national nomination and international voting levels. It
also analyzes why states may, in many instances, be against what appear to
be reasonable and legitimacy-enhancing reforms. Mandatory quotas or
aspirational targets may be advisable should enhanced procedures fail, or as
an alternative to them. The feasibility or desirability of potential reforms
may vary by the court involved.
A. Enhance Candidate Selection Procedures
To improve the probability of the nomination of women as well as
other non-status quo candidates for international judgeships, national
selection procedures must be made more open and accessible for courts
where they are currently closed and opaque. Rather than simply giving
national groups or state officials completely unfettered and unguided
discretion in selecting nominees, qualifications requirements and
procedures to be employed at the national level should be spelled out in
greater detail by the states that utilize these courts. For example, states
parties could pass resolutions, like the Assembly of the State Parties to the
ICC, clarifying what kinds of qualities and experiences they expect judges
will have. Like the procedures for nominating judges to the European Court
of Human Rights, relevant political bodies can provide examples of
different procedures or “best practices” that can be utilized in the
nomination and selection of candidates at the national level. These
practices might include public advertisement for potential candidates, a
more detailed description of the candidate evaluation process and necessary
qualifications, participants in the nomination and evaluation processes, and
deadlines.
Alternatively, or in addition, all states could be required to detail
what standards and procedures they intend to use in their domestic
nomination processes, what procedure took place, and how many nominees
were considered, along with their list of nominees. This information could
then be filed with the Registrar of the relevant court. The idea is that if
states must draft explicit standards and procedures for international judge
nominees, they are more likely to employ them. Such requirements will
help to identify a broader pool of candidates and show the public, including
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interested NGOs, what procedures are followed. If nomination procedures
are brought to the attention of interested members of the public, officials
charged with selecting candidates are less likely simply to go with who they
know and more likely to conduct a search with a more diverse and
meritorious pool of candidates.
Another way to make the process more transparent is to allow nonstate actors to take part in vetting potential candidates or to require states to
create national nominating commissions which represent the relevant
constituencies in a particular state. If commissions are used, they should
reflect the diverse makeup of the society.231 States could also create
commissions composed of relevant stakeholders at the international level to
vet candidates proposed by states, as the ICC, the ECHR, ECOWAS and the
ECJ are currently doing to different extents. Commissions could be
composed of individuals with some knowledge of the subject matter
jurisdiction of the relevant court and guidance about necessary
qualifications for competent judges. As suggested by the International Bar
Association, such commissions could draw on the model of the United
Nations Internal Justice Council as well.232 The United Nations General
Assembly created the Council, composed of reputable lawyers and a small
secretariat to be appointed by the United Nations Secretary General, to
propose lists of qualified candidates to states for the UN tribunals charged
with hearing internal staff complaints.233
Shining light on, requiring systematization of and involving more
231
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stakeholders in selection procedures is more likely to result in the
consideration of a broader and more competent array of candidates because
of greater public participation and accountability.
Closed, opaque
procedures, on the other hand, create few incentives for those choosing
nominees to move beyond their own personal contact lists and to forego the
benefits that may accrue to them personally by choosing people within their
own networks.
Yet states may have principled reasons to reject enhanced
procedures. States may prefer the opportunity to control tightly the
nomination and election process for international judges rather than opening
it to the light of day. Creating commissions and transparency may run
counter to their understanding of the proper relationship between states and
international courts more generally. Erik Voeten has identified a number of
motivations which may affect how a state approaches international judicial
appointments, including signaling credible commitments to a particular
cause such as human rights, influencing the court’s decision-making in a
way that protects a state’s sovereign interests or promotes an activist
agenda, advancing liberal internationalist norms, and political
patronage.234 Keeping the selection process primarily in the hands of
individual states may allow states more effectively to pursue some of these
goals. For example, at the national level, opacity and lack of procedure
simplifies the nomination process and gives state officials the opportunity to
grant political favors. Public calls for nominations and national selection
commissions would limit a state official’s ability to reward loyalists.
In addition, unfettered discretion makes it possible for states to
promote candidates who will vote in line with a state’s perceived interests
and broader foreign policy agenda. Provided closed and opaque selection
procedures, national governments may select or vote on candidates because
they believe individuals will vote in a particular way should issues of
importance to that state arise. For example, a large state with a powerful
military may choose an ICC candidate who would interpret broadly key
terms in international criminal and humanitarian law such as “necessity”
and “proportionality,” so that the law develops in a manner that gives the
state greater flexibility in its war-waging techniques. A smaller, less
powerful state might choose a candidate with a narrower understanding as a
protective measure against its larger and aggressive neighbors.
Hypotheticals are unnecessary to make the point. As Voeten has
234
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demonstrated, governments in favor of European integration chose more
activist judges for the European Court of Human Rights. 235 In the same
vein, the United States and other states have taken an active role in
interviewing and vetting candidates for membership on the WTO Appellate
Body to ensure their consistency with their interests.236 They have de facto
vetoed candidates who disagree or are perceived to disagree with them on
important policy matters.237 The less power states have to nominate and
elect the candidates of their choice, the less likely they are able to shape the
future decisions of international courts.
Eric Posner and John Yoo might add that enhanced selection
procedures promote the “independent” nature of many international courts,
which may undermine their effectiveness. Posner and Yoo define
“independence” as “a measure of the tribunal member’s vulnerability to the
state that appoints him. Tribunals composed of dependent members have a
strong incentive to serve the joint interests of the disputing states.” 238
Independent members, on the other hand, are less motivated to serve
disputing states’ interests, and morals, ideology and the interests of other
states may influence their decision-making.239 Because independent judges’
rulings are less likely to appease the litigating parties than dependent
judges, compliance will decline, and so will the effectiveness of the
Court.240
Transparent selection procedures with screening at the
international level are more likely to produce independent judges. Members
of selection commissions at the international level are likely to screen out or
rank lower candidates they perceive as biased toward a particular state or set
of interests, so long as the commission itself is composed of individuals
representing states with diverse interests.
But if a state’s goals are to promote the rule of law or signal a
commitment to a particular normative regime, it may prefer to appoint
judges through transparent and merit-based process. Alternatively, whether
states perceive adjudicators as trustees of a particular legal regime, rather
than agents who merely reflect their policy preferences, may affect their
disposition to more open and merit-based selection procedures. In
235
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distinguishing between trustees and agents in the international courts
context, Karen Alter wrote,
Principals choose to delegate to Trustees, as opposed to
Agents, when the point of delegation is to harness the authority of
the Trustee so as to enhance the legitimacy of political decisionmaking. Trustees are (1) selected because of their personal
reputation or professional norms, (2) given independent authority to
make decisions according to their best judgment or professional
criteria, and (3) empowered to act on behalf of a beneficiary.241
Agents, on the other hand, are expected to be loyal to and implement the
decisions of the Principal.242 Screening commissions at the international
level may serve to filter out Agents in favor of Trustees. They may choose
judges who will interpret the law with reference to the prevailing legal
discourse, professional norms and moral ideals rather than in accord with
the political sensibilities of the Principal.
Open procedures at the national level and international screening or
ranking of candidates for international judicial office decrease states’ ability
to affect substantive legal decision-making in international courts. They
cannot simply choose the candidate who they expect will vote their way on
a given matter. At the same time, these enhanced procedures are more
likely to result in decision-making that is independent from state influence
and focused on cultivating the rule of law, qualities which strengthen the
legitimacy of these institutions. And it appears that such enhanced
procedures coincide with greater opportunity for women, and perhaps
others, to serve on international court benches.
B. Aspirational Targets or Temporary Mandatory Quotas
Enhanced procedures may not be acceptable to states, or they may
not work to change the sex unrepresentative status quo. What about
aspirational targets or quotas? A comparison of courts with
representativeness requirements against courts without them suggests that
representativeness requirements are correlated with greater numbers of
women judges on the bench over time. From their establishment until mid2015, women have occupied only 15% of slots of courts without
representation requirements, as compared to 32% of slots for courts with
them. While the percentage of women judges has increased over time for
241
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both categories of courts, the overall percentage of women judges on courts
with no representativeness requirement has never broken 20%. It has
reached 40% for courts with representativeness requirements.
Consequently, the adoption of aspirational language or of mandatory targets
may result in better sex representativeness on the bench. Mandatory targets
could be adopted at the nomination stage, as the ECHR does, or quotas
could be instituted at the voting phase, as the ICC does. This section
considers the pros and cons of such measures, and ultimately concludes
that, should enhanced selection procedures fail to achieve more sex
representative bodies, or should states disfavor them, temporary mandatory
measures are worth considering.
Concrete steps to open up international courts benches to women are
not only permitted by international law, but also may be required by it.
CEDAW’s Article 11 specifies that “States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of
employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women,
the same rights, in particular: …(b) [t]he right to the same employment
opportunities, including the application of the same criteria for selection in
matters of employment.”243 States have agreed that the use of special
measures of a temporary duration may very well be appropriate to foster
equality.244 As of June 2014, 188 states considered themselves to be parties
to CEDAW.245
The 1995 Beijing Declaration, subsequently adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly, emphasized the importance of full participation
243
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in decision-making and access to power.246 In the Beijing Platform, states
agreed to
Commit themselves to establishing the goal of gender balance in
governmental bodies and committees, as well as in public
administrative entities, and in the judiciary, including, inter alia,
setting specific targets and implementing measures to substantially
increase the number of women with a view to achieving equal
representation of women and men, if necessary through positive
action, in all governmental and public administration positions.247
With respect to United Nations bodies, states agreed to “[a]im at gender
balance in the lists of national candidates nominated for election or
appointment to United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and other
autonomous organizations of the United Nations system, particularly for
posts at the senior level.”248 Other global and regional treaties authorize and
promote the use of temporary measures to ensure equality of opportunity
and non-discrimination, including the International Labor Organization’s
Convention No. 111249 and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.250
246
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Interestingly, aspirational and mandatory targets have become more
broadly accepted in the domestic political context in recent years, and they
exist in over one hundred countries in various forms. 251 For example,
France requires all political parties to list equal numbers of men and women
in most elections,252 Rwanda’s Constitution specifies that at least 30% of
each decision-making body must be composed of women.253 Argentina
mandates that women must be placed in electable positions on party lists.254
The Iraqi Constitution aims for at least one-quarter of the Council of
Representatives to consist of women.255 At least a few states have adopted
quotas for the judiciary as well. The Transitional Constitution of South
Sudan states that “[t]here shall be a substantial representation of women in
the Judiciary having regard to competence, integrity, credibility and
impartiality.”256 Belgium recently adopted a quota for women on its
constitutional court.257
In response to low participation of women on European corporate
boards and low growth rates over time, some legislatures have instituted
mandatory minimum requirements.258 Norway instituted a 40% of either sex
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights
of Women in Africa art. 1, adopted July 11, 2003, http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/Protocol%20on%C20the%C20
Rights%C20of% 20Women.pdf.
251
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requirement on boards of all privately owned public limited companies, and
non-compliance can result in penalties and even dissolution of the
company.259 Since the institution of the quota, participation on corporate
boards rose from 25% in 2004 to 42% in 2009.260 In March 2007, Spain
passed a law requiring public companies and other large firms with more
than 250 employees to develop plans to promote equal participation on
boards and to try to achieve 40% participation of each sex within eight
years.261 In late 2010, France adopted a law requiring listed companies and
companies with 500 or more employees and revenues over 50 million euros
to appoint 40% women on boards within six years.262 The Netherlands,
Italy, and Belgium also adopted quota laws. 263 Austria, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom make reference to gender in corporate governance codes. 264 A
study by the European Commission’s Network on to Promote Women in
Decision-making in Politics and the Economy asserted that “a wave of
quota debates is sweeping over Europe, creating more awareness with the
public and putting pressure on companies and governments to make fast and
fundamental changes in the representation of women in decisionmaking.”265 In November 2013, the EU Parliament voted to require
European companies to hire 40% women for corporate board positions by
2020.266 The issue of gender diversity on corporate boards and possible
remedies including quotas has been discussed in non-European countries as
well, including South Africa and Australia.267
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Despite the now widespread use of quotas at the political level, on
corporate boards, and to a lesser extent, in judiciaries, counter-arguments to
the use of mandatory quotas exist. It is more difficult to find arguments
against aspirational targets. Aspirational targets simply point out to
nominators that sex representation is a worthwhile goal. They express the
community of relevant states’ values about who should be represented on
the bench as a whole, but they impose no requirement to reject or accept a
candidate based on sex. From a political standpoint, aspirational language
may show domestic political constituencies that their states have, at least, a
political commitment to sex representation. (One could imagine a more
widespread use of such language to encompass other groups as well, such as
to include indigenous people or people of minority status within their own
states.) Aspiring to a fair representation of the sexes led to a dramatic
difference on the ICTY and the ICTR between the percentage of women
serving as ad litem (aspirational sex representativeness language) as
compared to permanent judges (no such language). Women served in much
higher percentages on the ad litem bench.268 On the other hand, women
have made up only 18% of the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights bench. Nonetheless, there are many other courts with even lower
percentages of women on the bench in June 2015, including ITLOS,
IACHR, ECOWAS, the WTO Appellate Body, and the ICTY’s permanent
judges.
Some might argue that targets of any kind are not worthwhile if they
do not result in “substantive representation,” or the promotion of women’s
concerns.269 The jury is still out on whether sex representativeness affects
international court decision-making, although there is some evidence that it
may make a difference in at least some cases. A 2007 study on the role of
gender in sexual assault decisions of international criminal tribunals
excluded the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in part because
there were “too few [women judges] to conduct empirical analysis…”270
The same study found that ICTY panels with female judges imposed more
severe sanctions on defendants who assaulted women, while male judges
imposed more severe sanctions on defendants who assaulted men.271
Another study showed that women judges were much more likely to rule in
favor of jurisdiction in cases under the auspices of the International Centre
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for the Settlement of Investment Disputes than men.272
A number of studies have sought to understand the relationship
between gender and judging in the United States, scholarship which may
help to illuminate the gender effect of judging in international courts, in the
absence of additional international data. Although many studies show a
limited or non-existent effect of gender on judging, cases involving family
law and discrimination appear to be an exception.273 One study found that a
sex discrimination plaintiff was 10 percentage points less likely to prevail if
the judge was male, and when a woman was present on a panel deciding
such a case, men were more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff.274
Another study showed that asylum applicants randomly assigned to women
judges were 44% more likely to prevail than those facing male judges. 275
Anecdotal evidence at the international level may also be instructive
in understanding that a gender diverse bench makes a difference. A number
of female judges have made statements implying that their experiences as
women gave them a particular sensitivity in certain cases. These include
former D.C. Court of Appeals and International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia Judge Patricia Wald, former International Criminal
Court Judge Navenathem Pillay, and former Inter-American Court of
Human Rights Judge Cecilia Medina.276 For example, Judge Wald wrote:
…being a woman and being treated by society as a woman can be a
vital element of a judge’s experience. That experience in turn can
subtly affect the lens through which she views issues and
solutions…. A judge is the sum of her experiences and if she has
suffered disadvantages of discrimination as a woman, she is apt to
be sensitive to its subtle expressions or to paternalism.277
272
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She has also pointed to five different major gender-crime precedents issued
when at least one woman sat on the bench.278 Judge Pillay suggested that
although women do not “decide in a different way,” they have a “particular
sensitivity and understanding about what happens to people who are
raped.”279 Former Inter-American Court Judge Cecilia Medina Quiroga
posited that her womanly perspective changed the reparations outcome in a
case involving a massacre and rape in Guatemala.280
National judges and lawyers from all over the world have made
similar points. For example, United States Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
while expressing doubts about the accuracy of studies on gender and
judging, suggested that “the presence of women on the bench made it
possible for the courts to appreciate earlier than they might otherwise that
sexual harassment belongs under Title VII.”281 Madame Justice Bertha
Wilson, the first woman on Canada’s court of last resort asserted that for
entire areas of the law, “there is no uniquely feminine perspective,” but in
others, “a distinctly male perspective is clearly discernible…”282 In the
same vein, Lady Baroness Hale, the sole woman ever to have served on the
United Kingdom’s highest court, posited that women bring “different
perceptions to the task of fact-finding—which is what most judges do much
of the time.”283 A European Commission survey of male and female judges
and other legal professionals found that, in cases involving violence against
women or children, family issues, and sometimes sex discrimination, “it is
recognized (mainly by the women interviewed that gender does have an
influence.”284 Although she thought gender made little difference most of
the time, an Israeli judge pointed out a number of instances where she
thought it did make a difference, including commercial cases and cases
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involving sexual assault.285
Some may argue that the presence of both men and women may
matter for some but not all courts. For example, sex representativeness may
be important on international criminal and human rights courts because
male and female judges may perceive gender-biased violence in different
ways, and victims may feel less comfortable relating such stories to a unisex
court.286 Further, for human rights courts in particular, some constituencies
will question the values and impartiality of a human rights court where half
of humanity is missing from the bench. If women judges relate to rape or
crimes of violence against women in a different way than men, then both
are necessary on the bench for impartiality. On the other hand, a mixed
bench may be unnecessary or irrelevant for a court that interprets the Law
of the Sea or trade agreements. If there is no difference in substantive
outcome, why is important to have a female or male judge on the Law of
the Sea Tribunal or on the WTO Appellate Body?
The presence of both sexes on the bench is important, regardless of
subject matter or whether a unique feminine or male perspective exists on a
particular factual or legal issue. International courts exercise public
authority by interpreting and shaping international law. 287 Democratic
values such as representation provide meaningful justification for the
exercise of such authority.288 In essence, those affected by decision-making
should play some role in the making of those decisions. As half of the
world, women are equally impacted by the decisions of international courts.
285
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Even if men and women were identical in their identification and
interpretation of relevant facts and application of law, it would still be
problematic to have all female benches or all male benches. Furthermore, if
these groups are identical in their reasoning and approach to legal analysis,
how can we justify the systematic exclusion of one of them?
Opponents of electoral quotas have argued that they “facilitate
access for ‘unqualified’ women with little interest in promoting women’s
concerns” and “reinforce stereotypes about women’s inferiority as political
actors.”289 Similar arguments could be made concerning mandatory judicial
quotas. If women are less qualified and replace more qualified male
candidates, their presence may detract from the authority of international
courts, and therefore, be ill-advised. Less incentive exists to respect and
comply with the decisions of international courts if the judges are not of
high caliber. Because of the small number of international judge positions
in the world – a few hundred at most – arguments about qualifications are
more difficult to make in this context than in domestic political elections.
Surely there are three women qualified to sit on the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, the WTO Appellate Body and the ECOWAS Court. And
there must be more than only one woman in the entire world qualified to
serve on the Law of the Sea Tribunal. Further, as described above, it is not
at all clear that merit is what motivates many judicial appointments in the
first place.290 In other words, the argument that women are “unqualified”
has little purchase when judicial nominees are often selected to reward
political loyalty or because of their relationships with nominators.
Another counter-argument to mandatory targets is that its
beneficiaries may be perceived as somehow inferior or less capable than
their male peers, even if they are equally or even more qualified.
Alternatively stated, women would not be in the courtroom but for the
quota. A quota and the corresponding perceived drop in the qualifications
of judges is dangerous for the authority of the court. The problem is that
current selection procedures appear to be keeping qualified women off the
bench, not that a quota would put unqualified women on it. Put otherwise,
it is simply inconceivable that no French or Russian woman is qualified to
serve as a permanent international judge. As for a failure to promote
“women’s concerns,” should men’s presence on the bench be justified on
289
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the basis of their ability to promote “men’s concerns”? Is this a litmus test
to be applied to all judges, or just female ones? Furthermore, the presence
of diversity in leadership is important for other reasons as well, such as nondiscrimination in employment opportunity, opening doors to other
previously excluded groups and democratic legitimacy.
If states decide they want women on the bench in greater numbers,
but do not want to give up tight control over who ultimately gets nominated
and selected, they may prefer quotas or aspirational targets over more
sweeping reforms to national nomination and international election
procedures. More sex representative benches may be more impartial, if and
when men and women judge differently, or be perceived to be more
impartial, even if men and women do not differ in their decision-making.
And more balanced benches would confer greater democratic legitimacy on
these courts, simply because more of humanity would be on the bench.
Since states have already agreed to quotas or aspirational targets for the
International Criminal Court, the European Court of Human Rights, the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and to a lesser extent in the
ICTY and the ICTR, they may be willing to do so for more international
courts. On the other hand, states may choose to craft more transparent and
merit-driven selection procedures, which appear to help open the
courthouse doors to women judges, possibly rendering quotas unnecessary.
CONCLUSION
Almost a quarter century after feminist approaches made their way into
international legal scholarship, women continue to be present in paltry
numbers in many international institutions, including international courts.
While women do occupy more seats today on most courts than 24 years
ago, on courts with no representation requirements, men usually take up at
least 80% of the bench.
A smaller pool of available candidates is an unpersuasive and
problematic justification for the status quo. First, the data does not support
it. States with higher percentages of women lawyers have not necessarily
appointed more women as the pool has grown. Some states with lower
percentages of women lawyers appear to appoint more women to the bench
than those with higher percentages. And the percentage of women judges
has dropped on some courts, or appears frozen at one or two women on the
bench, although it is reasonable to assume the pool has grown over time.
Women occupied the same number of seats on the IACHR in June 2015 as
they did in 1991. The percentage of female ad litem judges has dropped
dramatically on both the ICTY and the ICTR over time. Only one woman
has ever served on ITLOS’s 21-member bench in almost twenty years, and
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the African Court has never exceeded two women on its eleven member
bench.
Second, in many cases, merit does not appear to be driving the
judicial selection process in the first place. If merit is not at the heart of the
process, then there is no reason to suppose that the pool of women
candidates is any smaller than the pool of male ones, or that naming women
would result in a less meritorious bench. Third, to the extent the pool
appears smaller for international courts than domestic ones, glass ceilings
and discrimination in the domestic context are at least partly at fault.
Declining to promote more women on this basis merely recreates and
reinforces the glass ceiling at the international level. Fourth, the number of
judicial slots available per year is quite low; a huge pool of women
candidates is not necessary to achieve a balanced bench.
Compelling reasons exist to seek a balanced representation of the
sexes on international court benches. Not only does appointing more
women create more equitable employment opportunities for women who
seek to become international judges, but also, it can create important ripple
effects. These include greater employment opportunities for women at the
domestic level and as counsel before international courts, in addition to new
mentorship opportunities and perhaps greater intent to participate in
international legal affairs among girls and women.291 Finally, as previously
described, greater balance on the bench will strengthen courts’ normative,
sociological and democratic legitimacy.
States may choose from different options for achieving a more
balanced bench. These include more transparency and rigor in selection
procedures at the national nomination and international election levels, as
well as participation by a broader array of stakeholders. Such measures
would reduce both the likelihood and perception of bias and cronyism in
judicial selection, as well as push nominators to move beyond their own
contact lists and encourage a more diverse slate of individuals to apply.
Aspirational statements concerning sex representativeness may also be
useful in bringing attention to the issue of fair representation and in
encouraging states to nominate and vote for female candidates. Finally, if
these steps do not achieve sex representative benches, temporary mandatory
quotas may be necessary to ensure that women get a fair opportunity to
serve on international court benches.
The problem is clear. The time has come to fix it.
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